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Abstract 
Reducing Demand for Ivory in China: 
A Qualitative & Quantitative Study 
Leo Bin Carter, MGPS 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
Supervisor:  Joshua Busby 
Over the past decade, the world has seen a precipitous decline in elephant 
populations largely due to poaching spurred by resurgent demand, growing incomes in 
Asia, and enforcement shortfalls in elephant range states. Demand for ivory, though the 
subject of many studies and the target of numerous public awareness campaigns across 
Asia, remains poorly understood. Public education campaigns have had substantial 
success educating the public of the negative impacts of ivory consumption, but little is 
yet understood about which messaging works best to modify consumption behavior. The 
end goal of all these efforts is reducing ivory consumption, but how are policymakers to 
know which campaigns are truly effective and which may be counter productive? This 
study attempts to shed some light on this issue.  
At the root of demand for ivory are a number of structural and normative 
problems. At the structural level, outdated laws and inconsistent policy implementation at 
the multiple levels of Chinese government make environmental campaigns difficult to 
implement. Issues of corruption, interference from private interests, and state-led 
vii 
promotion of cultural heritage industries compound these problems. At the normative 
level, attitudes towards wildlife conservation and conscientious consumption are new in 
China. The determinants of demand, often rooted in deeply held personal beliefs, vary 
across demographic groups and between individuals. Campaigns must be designed with 
the Chinese consumers and their unique cultural values in mind and be targeted to 
individual subgroups in order to maximize efficacy. Shifting norms is a slow process and 
must also be bolstered by consistent government enforcement.  
This report proceeds in three sections. The first introduces the global trade in 
ivory, what is known about demand for ivory in China and consumer groups, and what 
still remains to be discovered, which is the inspiration for this report. The second section 
discusses the structural obstacles to demand reduction, with a specific eye to the Chinese 
political and social context. It covers relevant domestic legislation, the role of civil 
society in forwarding conservation goals, and the efforts and successes thus far in the 
fight against ivory trafficking. Part three presents the results of an online experimental 
survey that tested how potential ivory consumers react to different conservation 
messaging and how that messaging modifies subsequent answers to questions about ivory 
consumption and incentivizes political action on conservation issues. The results of the 
survey show that receiving conservation-related messaging is effective in manipulating 
subjects responses to questions regarding attitudes towards ivory, both at the policy level 
and at the level of individual consumption behavior. 
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I: Ivory Demand & the Illicit Trade 
INTRODUCTION 
In less than a decade, the global illicit trade in wildlife has become a $19 billion 
USD a year industry, the fourth largest illegal trade on the planet.1 Fueled by rising 
incomes and resurgent demand in Asia, this trade has caused populations of a number of 
culturally iconic and environmental important species to fall dramatically. The trafficking 
in elephant ivory is just one example of this transnational illicit sector that connects 
criminal networks, poachers, corrupt officials, and consumers around the world. Between 
2007 and 2016, Africa lost an estimated 104,000 to 114,000 elephants largely due to a 
surge in poaching over the same period.2 In the short span between 2007 and 2013, the 
amount of illegal ivory seized by law enforcement authorities increased more than six 
times.3 Two thirds of those large seizures occurred in demand countries in Asia.4 China, 
in particular, has persisted as the largest destination for illegal ivory in the world.5 
Although the most recent data shows a slight decline poaching from a peak in 2011, it 
continues to be a grave threat to the future of African elephants.6 
                                                
1 Cheryl Lo & Gavin Edwards. The Hard Truth: How Hong Kong’s Ivory Trade is Fueling Africa’s 
Elephant Poaching Crisis. WWF. Hong Kong, 2015. 
2 C.R. Thouless, et al. African Elephant Status Report 2016. IUCN/SSC African Elephant Specialist Group, 
IUCN. Gland, Switzerland, 2016.  
3 T. Milliken, et al. The Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) and the Illicit Trade in Ivory, 
Traffic, CITES CoP17 Doc. 57.6, 2016.  
4 Tom Milliken. Illegal Trade in Ivory and Rhino Horn: An Assessment to Improve Law Enforcement 
Under the Wildlife Traps Project. USAID and Traffic. Cambridge, UK, 2014: 7.  
5 T. Milliken, R. Burn, L. Sangalakula. The Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) and the Illicit Trade 
in Ivory: A Report to the 15th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES. Report for CITES CoP15 
Doc.44.1. 2009. 
6 CITES. “MIKE Report: Levels and Trends of Illegal Killing of Elephants in Africa to December 2016 – 
Preliminary Findings.” CITES, Geneva, Switzerland. 3 March 2017.  
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China accounts for as much as 70% of the global ivory market, legal and illegal.7 
Despite—or perhaps partly because of—China’s relatively positive law enforcement 
record, between 2012 and 2014 China averaged almost 2,000 seizures of raw and worked 
ivory, totaling more than 41,000 kilograms, alone surpassing the second highest group, 
which includes Kenya and Tanzania, the epicenter of the poaching crisis in Africa.8 
Transnational organized crime networks and an increasingly militarized poaching force 
have supplied spiking demand for ivory among a growing Chinese middle class. Ivory 
outlets across China have effectively used legal stocks as cover to launder illegal ivory 
while a growing number of transactions are occurring online where enforcement is 
difficult. Problematic ivory registration and certification systems and insufficient law 
enforcement have compounded the problem. The Convention on the International Trade 
in Endangered Species (CITES) has proven largely ineffective at controlling domestic 
ivory markets, at times even exacerbating demand with one-off sales of ivory done at the 
behest of ivory supply and demand countries. A complete domestic market closure, set to 
take full effect in China at the end of 2017, signals unequivocally that ivory is no longer a 
legal commodity, but may drive more consumption underground and fuel demand in 
neighboring markets. Both demand and supply must be addressed simultaneously through 
a mixed strategy focusing on demand reduction campaigns that target present and 
potential consumers and effective law enforcement strategies to regulate the black market 
in Africa and Asia.  
This first section of this report discusses in detail the macro and micro factors 
driving demand for elephant ivory, with a specific look at the Chinese market. The 
                                                
7 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Closing China’s Ivory Market: Will It Save Elephants?” The New York Times, 31 
December 31 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/31/world/africa/africa-ivory-china.html. 
8 T. Milliken et al., The Elephant Trade Information System: 13.  
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information presented is drawn from previous quantitative and qualitative research by 
NGOs and academics in China and elsewhere and serves as theoretical basis for the final 
section. The second section looks more closely at the structural obstacles that make 
market control and demand reduction difficult in China and how they can be overcome. 
This section focuses on the current state of the ivory trade, the legal and enforcement 
mechanisms used to counter wildlife trafficking and address demand for wildlife 
products, and the capacity for homegrown civil society and opinion leaders to be a 
positive force for change in an area traditionally led by Western environmental 
organizations. The third section reviews in detail the results of the experimental survey 
on demand for ivory in China. This study tested how ivory consumers and non-
consumers respond to conservation messaging by measuring how this messaging 
influences responses to a range of questions covering everything from intent to buy ivory 
to attitudes towards market regulation. The hope is that tentative conclusions drawn from 
these results can be used to inform civil society efforts, improve information campaigns, 
and strengthen enforcement operations in China and elsewhere.  
DEFINING DEMAND FOR IVORY 
Demand—for any product—is a notoriously problematic concept to define. The 
commodification of ivory is particularly complex because it is driven both by recent 
capitalist globalization and, paradoxically, by a deep-rooted cultural and historical 
resistance to modernity and materialism. It is a product whose value is created both by 
the influence of broad economic trends and by narrower personal and cultural factors that 
are difficult to measure. Micro-economic theories of scarcity and information uncertainty 
give only a partial picture of how demand develops and persists, and can at times be 
misleading. Psychological and socio-cultural perspectives, while they shed greater light 
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on the motivations of individual consumers, are difficult to generalize and researchers 
may at times find themselves missing the forest for the trees. A balanced approach that 
combines the relevant economic principles with a closer look at the complex cultural and 
historical determinants of demand is necessary to craft more effective demand reduction 
strategies. It is necessary to assess both global economic trends and consumption habits at 
the national, local, and individual levels to explain the surge in demand for ivory. Both 
exogenous political factors, such as the CITES one-off sales and inconsistencies in 
national level ivory policy, and endogenous factors, such as cultural, historical, and 
personal values attributed to ivory play highly influential roles on consumer behavior. 
The goal of this study is to—to the extent possible—disentangle these effects and provide 
a clearer picture of what drives demand for ivory in China. 
Endogenous Factors 
 Although the importance of understanding the profile of an ivory consumer 
cannot be understated, it remains one of the most difficult tasks conservationists face 
because triggers for consumption can vary hugely from individual to individual. 
Nonetheless, it is necessary to work to identify commonalities between consumers at 
global and regional levels in order to better understand the nature of ivory demand and 
how to address it. Although it is well understood that demand analysis is critical to 
addressing consumption, it is only recently that scholars and environmental organizations 
have dedicated greater focus to it. ENGOs such as the National Geographic Society, the 
International Fund for Animal Welfare, World Wildlife Fund for Nature, and the Nature 
Conservancy along with many independent researchers have contributed greatly to 
understanding the factors that contribute to demand and how they can be targeted. This 
section focuses on what we know thus far about who buys ivory and for what reasons by 
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looking at broad regional surveys and more specific in country research. Three broad 
categories help describe ivory’s perceived desirability among consumers: its cultural and 
aesthetic value as a historically important art form in Asia and elsewhere, the value of 
conspicuous consumption and gift giving among the middle and upper classes, and its 
investment potential due to increasing scarcity. 
Ivory was treasured throughout Chinese history for its perceived spiritual traits 
and as the material most befitting of Buddhist fine art carvings. Ivory carving dates back 
to prehistoric China and references to ivory as one of the principle raw materials in art 
production can be found in some the earliest surviving texts.9 In ancient dynasties, the 
elephant was closely associated with royalty and some Buddhists believe the animal itself 
to be an incarnation of the Buddha.10 It was and continues to be reputed to have spiritual 
and health benefits for those who wear it. For centuries ivory carving was preserved as 
one of the great Chinese art forms and, until very recently, the government actively 
promoted traditional carving as intangible cultural heritage. In fact, the ivory carving 
industry was in decline in China for much of the 20th century until the intervention of the 
government. Beginning in 2006, China’s State Forestry Administration (SFA) actively 
lobbied CITES to allow one-off sales of ivory from African countries in the name of 
preserving and sustaining China’s cultural heritage and as means of supplying a booming 
arts investment industry.11 In China, Buddhist religious art has become a multi-billion 
dollar industry and continues to grow.12 Fine art collectors who seek high-value 
                                                
9 Carl W. Bishop, “The Elephant and Its Ivory in Ancient China,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 
41 (1921): pp. 290 - 306. 
10 Ibid: 301. 
11 Yufang Gao & Susan G. Clark, “Elephant Ivory Trade in China: Trends and Drivers,” Biological 
Conservation 180 (December 2014): pp. 23–30. 
12 Bryan Christy, “Ivory Worship,” National Geographic 222 (2012): pp. 28–61. 
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traditional ivory carvings have proven a persistent demand group.13 Although there is a 
long history of ivory carving in China, the recent demand boom can be largely attributed 
to rising incomes and state-led promotion of the industry. 
Conspicuous consumption of luxury goods and a deeply rooted tradition of gift 
giving are also important perspective from which to interpret the nature of demand for 
ivory in Asia. Commercial value is only one aspect of ivory’s overall value and can be 
misleading if historical, social, and cultural qualities are not considered. Previous survey 
research has described likely buyers of ivory as “motivated by a desire for products that 
convey financial and social status,” and are most drawn to ivory because of its 
“suitability for gifting.”14 The giving of luxury gifts endows prestige on the receiver and 
is closely related to maintaining face (mianzi) and bolstering guanxi, the important 
network of personal relationships.15 In China, guanxi is viewed as essential in enhancing 
social status and opening doors for professional advancement. Closely associated with 
social influence and power, guanxi necessitates the constant reciprocal exchange of 
favors and gifts.16 Ivory and other high-value luxury goods are a social currency viewed 
as necessary in navigating upward through China’s rigid social and professional 
hierarchies. Giving ivory gifts is not only a way to pay deep respect and honor to the 
recipient, but is also a means of expressing ones own social status and wealth. Ivory’s 
value is inflated by its transactional nature, building status not only for the receiver, but 
the giver as well. 
                                                
13 Lishu Li. Interview by author. In-person interview. Guangzhou, China, 21 February 2017. 
14 National Geographic and Globescan. Reducing Demand for Ivory: An International Study. National 
Geographic, 2015. Accessed March 18, 2017. http://press.nationalgeographic.com/files/2015/09/NGS2015_ 
Final- August-11-RGB.pdf. 
15 Gao & Clark. Elephant Ivory Trade in China: 27.  
16 Wang Qian, Mohammed Abdur Razzaque, and Kau Ah Keng, “Chinese Cultural Values and Gift‐giving 
Behavior,” Journal of Consumer Marketing 24, no. 4. 3 July 2007: pp. 214–28. 
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 Prior to the initial implementation of the China’s domestic ivory ban in March of 
2017, the price of ivory rose consistently and dramatically. Between 2006 and 2011, the 
wholesale price of ivory tripled to as high as 2,300 USD/kg.17 It is no wonder that, with 
short-term returns as high as these, one of the common reasons cited by dealers and 
buyers for purchasing was ivory as an alleged “inflation-proof investment.”18 In a 
previous survey of Chinese ivory consumers, 16% of those who had purchased ivory 
claim they did so as an investment with the intention of reselling when prices increased.19 
In the survey completed for this report, 30% of all respondents claimed financial value 
was the most important reason for purchasing ivory. In addition to promoting its cultural 
value, many in the carving and sales industries advertise ivory as a viable investment 
opportunity, leading to speculation among buyers.20 In an economy with a shaky and 
heavily regulated stock market and a volatile property market, ivory, with the high 
returns it promises, can be an appealing alternative investment. This, coupled with an 
ambiguous legal status, can potentially draw a diverse mix of investors. As the 
government begins implementing the ivory ban in China, ivory’s market value—and thus 
its desirability as a legal investment option—has shown initial signs of decline. However, 
less regulated markets across Asia have seen demand and prices for ivory continue to 
rise, allowing Chinese investors opportunities for profit-seeking in a deeply integrated 
international market place. Furthermore, while smaller scale illegal ivory seizures had 
begun to decrease through 2014, medium and large scale seizures remained constant, 
                                                
17 Grace Gabriel, Ning Hua, Juan Wang. Making a Killing : A 2011 Survey of Ivory Markets in China. 
Yarmouth Port, MA: IFAW, 2011. (Accessed: 14 February 2017). 
http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/Making%20a%20Killing.pdf. 
18 Gao and Clark, “Elephant Ivory Trade in China.”: 27.  
19 National Geographic and Globescan. Reducing Demand for Ivory: 19. 
20 Aster Zhang, , Ph. D., Beijing Normal University. Interview by author. Web call. Beijing China, 31 
March 2017.  
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implying a presence of organized crime and a persistent black market.21 The impacts of 
the Chinese domestic ivory ban will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Exogenous Factors 
In 2008, under pressure from the ivory carving industry and state agencies, CITES 
permitted a one-off sale of 62 tons of confiscated African ivory to China.22 This was the 
second large-scale sale of its kind, the first of which went to Japan in 2006.23 The belief 
was that flooding the Chinese market with surplus ivory would depress prices and 
decrease demand and the extra revenue generated could be reinvested into conservation 
projects. The Chinese government instead released limited amounts of the ivory to state-
sanctioned factories over time, causing prices to rise and fueling demand over an 
extended period.24 Parsing it out over time in this way also allowed unscrupulous dealers 
to replenish ‘legal’ stocks by laundering illegal ivory through their inventories. The fact 
that four government owned facilities were the principal beneficiaries of this sale, and 
that they profited from an almost 1000% mark-up (a government fixed price), only 
emphasizes the conflicts of interest.25 CITES voluntary nature and its reliance on 
effective self-policing by signatory governments have caused further problems for 
uniform enforcement. Under the treaty’s provisions, countries may take exemptions to 
trade bans if they feel unfairly impacted. Between 2011 and 2013, Zimbabwe took an 
exemption from the ban in order to export worked ivory products to China. Trophy and 
antique exemptions have created a market environment where legal and illegal ivory mix 
                                                
21 CITES. Report on the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS). CoP17 Doc. 57.6 (Rev. 1). 
Johannesburg, South Africa, 2016. 
22 IFAW. Making a Killing: 2.  
23 CITES. Report on ETIS: 5.  
24 Christy, “Ivory Worship.” 
25 Environmental Investigation Agency. Vanishing Point: Criminality, Corruption, and the Devastation of 
Tanzania’s Elephants. London, UK. November 2014: 29-30. 
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indiscriminately in regulated markets and consumers have little capacity to ascertain what 
they are buying, where its from, and the ethical dilemmas involved. Furthermore, the 
implications of the international community’s sole organization empowered to regulate 
trade in endangered species sending mixed messages about the acceptability and legality 
of ivory cannot be understated. CITES inconsistency before pressures from demand and 
supply countries has facilitated the growth of a gray market and increased moral 
ambiguity around the consumption of ivory.  
The recent history of Chinese wildlife conservation policy has also been one of 
legal ambiguity and mixed messaging. Prior to the recent ban, the SFA’s self-stated goal 
behind the regulation of the ivory market was less one of conservation and more the 
promotion of intangible cultural heritage.26 Government agencies are also responsible for 
licensing, monitoring, and extracting revenue from the 37 factories and 145 legal ivory 
retail outlets. Combining active support for a legal domestic carving industry on one 
hand, and rigid law enforcement to suppress illegal trade through complex inter-agency 
responsibility on the other, is a difficult balancing act to accomplish. These conflicting 
policies have resulted in conflicts of interest and a series of half-measures, which have 
facilitated the growth of a large ivory gray market in China. Discrepancies between 
national laws and an opaque supply chain have help create what Annette Hübschle calls 
“contested illegality,” a space in which legal ambiguity and cultural resistance allow for 
the rationalization of immoral behavior.27 A consumer’s distance from the poaching crisis 
and deeply entrenched attitudes towards ivory as an important cultural commodity can 
                                                
26 Yufang Gao & Susan Clark. “Perceptions and Information on Elephant Ivory Trade in China: 
Opportunities and Recommendations.” The International Journal of Conservation. Cambridge University 
Press (unpublished). 
27 Annette M. Hübschle. A Game of Horns: Transnational Flows of Rhino Horn. Dissertation. IMPRS-
SPCE, Cologne, Germany (2016). http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/pubman/item/escidoc:2218357:5/ 
component/escidoc:2261029/2016_IMPRSDiss_Huebschle.pdf.  
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allow for the rationalization of illegal behavior and insulate the consumer from guilt and 
even punishment, especially where enforcement is inconsistent or lacking. Problematic 
legislation, failures of law enforcement to control black market sales, and the laundering 
of illegal ivory through legal stocks are discussed in detail in the subsequent chapter.  
Organized crime, perhaps the most persistent of the exogenous factors, is present 
at each level of the ivory supply chain, implicating everyone from poachers and park 
rangers in Africa to law enforcement and government officials in Asia. Opportunities for 
corruption exist at all points in the trade chain, and once illegal ivory has entered the 
market, it is particularly hard to weed out.28 Genetic testing and carbon dating techniques 
are, as of yet, prohibitively expensive and slow to implement. Furthermore, whereas 
many end consumers can be susceptible to targeted information campaigns and threats of 
punishment, criminal enterprises are not similarly responsive and are also more adept at 
navigating enforcement obstacles. Investigators have discovered ties between ivory 
poachers and Chinese criminal syndicates that often use complex networks of shell 
companies to evade detection.29 Most recently, a report by the Environmental 
Investigation Agency (EIA) detailed the expansive international network of one Chinese 
criminal syndicate that relied on complicity from park rangers, customs officials, and 
transporters throughout a number range countries in Africa and transit ports in Asia.30 
The organization, which has been in operation for two decades and is implicated in large-
scale ivory seizures from Africa to Southeast Asia, proved resilient to risk and, having 
never suffered an arrest, very adaptable to changing law enforcement circumstances.31  
                                                
28 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Closing China’s Ivory Market: Will It Save Elephants?”. 
29 EIA. Vanishing Point: 31-32. 
30 The Environmental Investigation Agency, “The Shuidong Connection: Exposing the Global Hub of the 
illegal Ivory Trade.” London, UK. July 2017. 
31 Ibid. 
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The most troubling aspect is that criminal prosecution and punishment lags far 
behind the surge in poaching and trafficking. In many cases, especially in Africa but in 
demand countries as well, criminal punishment often amounts only to small fines and 
many cases don’t result in criminal prosecutions at all. China has some of the strictest 
punishments for illegal trafficking in the world. In 2013, eight smugglers were sentenced 
to up to 15 years in prison for smuggling more than three tons of ivory into China.32 A 
handful of high profile arrests and long prison sentences have not sufficed to dissuade 
poaching and trafficking, however, as only a small percentage of smugglers are caught 
and punished. Professional criminal enterprises (as in the case of the Shuidong network 
mentioned above) may never suffer more than the occasional confiscation of a shipment, 
financial losses that they can quickly recuperate.33 Between 2009 and 2013, only 12% of 
large-scale seizures were accompanied by reports of suspects or subsequent arrests.34 
Ivory has become so lucrative that profits outweigh the relatively low risk of being 
caught. Furthermore, the flexibility of criminal networks and their presence around the 
world allows them to shift from market to market and from illicit product to illicit 
product relatively easily, exploiting the discrepancies in laws and enforcement capacity 
between different countries. Finally, because the supply-chain is transnational, a 
concerted and sustained international law enforcement effort is needed. Outside of a 
handful of highly publicized and short-lived operations, this collaboration has been slow 
to evolve. Discrepancies in national wildlife trafficking laws and enforcement efforts 
have made unified efforts to address transnational wildlife crime difficult, to say the least. 
                                                
32 CITES, “China Increases Prosecutions in Response to Illegal Trade in Elephant Ivory,” Accessed: 11 
July 2017, https://cites.org/eng/news/sundry/2013/20131128_china_ivory_prosecutions.php. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Tom Milliken. Illegal Trade in Ivory and Rhino Horn: 9.  
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Self-interest and imperfect information have further complicated international 
consensus on both the threats to elephants and the best means of addressing them by 
creating space for competing perceptions of scientific reality. Only recently have ivory 
consumers in Asia begun to come to terms with the impact of their individual 
consumption on wildlife half a world away. Many have only recently realized that ivory 
consumption leads to the slaughter of elephants. The Chinese word for ivory, ‘xiangya’ 
or ‘elephant tooth,’ has led some Chinese to believe that elephants simply lose their tusks 
naturally. Even among consumers who understand ivory’s origin, the rationalization that 
‘my meager purchase of a small piece of carved ivory can’t possibly contribute to 
poaching in Africa’ is persistent.35 The fact that a large majority of Chinese ivory 
consumers supported a complete market ban is further evidence of a stark divide between 
individual consumption behavior and political attitudes.36 Knowledge about the 
connections between buying ivory and elephant population declines (and negative follow-
on effects for human populations) is new in Asia, and even now, is most common among 
wealthier urban citizens. This has allowed for equivocation and justifications, not only at 
the individual level, but also among government agencies. Until recently, China’s SFA 
had maintained that allegations that Chinese demand was driving elephant poaching were 
“not evidence-based,” and that Western NGOs and conservationists had politicized the 
ivory discourse.37 The perpetuation of competing ‘East versus West’ rivalries, while it 
may satisfy narrow political interests, is a false frame that presents facts as subjective 
ideologies. Politicizing conservation allows for counter-productive actions that pit market 
forces against environmental policy. Scientific consensus is a basic prerequisite for 
                                                
35 National Geographic & Globescan. Reducing Demand for Ivory: 19. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Gao & Clark. Perceptions and Information: 10 – 11.  
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fighting international wildlife crime in a unified fashion. Only from this consensus can 
political cooperation on transnational environmental issues follow.  
Supply and Demand for Elephant Ivory 
 
The supply and demand curves show a theoretical model for shifts in quantity and price of ivory. As 
enforcement improves and elephant numbers drop, the supply curve shifts up (S2), quantity drops and price 
increases (P2 and Q`2). Rising incomes in Asia move the Demand curve right (D2) increasing prices further 
(P3), which can lead to increased poaching (Q3). In order to address this, demand reduction efforts and 
better enforcement in Asia can move demand back to the left (D3), reducing quantity supplied (Q3) and 
price (P3). 
By far the strongest macro-driver of demand for ivory is unequal economic 
growth between Asia and Africa. China’s middle class is projected to account for more 
than a third of its population by 2030, and luxury goods consumption grew at a rate of 16 
to 20 percent per year from 2009 to 2013.38 Meanwhile, the income gap between China 
                                                
38 Mandy Zuo. “China’s Middle Class to Rise to More than Third of Population by 2030, Research Firm 
Says,” South China Morning Post, November 3, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/money-
wealth/article/2042441/chinas-middle-class-rise-more-third-population-2030-research. 
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and many of the African countries where elephants are endemic—some of Africa’s 
poorest—continues to grow. Ivory yields a ten times higher price in China than in Africa, 
further fueling the poaching crisis.39 The above theoretical model shows broad macro-
economic trends in the ivory market, but only gives a partial picture of the complex 
interactions between rising incomes and prices. Slumping elephant numbers and 
increased anti-trafficking and anti-poaching efforts have restricted supply and potentially 
exacerbated  the increase in prices, leading some economists to advocate for a controlled 
legal trade in ivory to depress prices and control demand. This view disregards the 
environmental and structural constraints of the transnational ivory supply chain and 
assumes a population of elephants that can satisfy ever-growing demand.  
Further complicating issues, luxury wildlife products like ivory and rhino horn 
may in actuality be price-inelastic, meaning that as prices increase, the demand for these 
products remains constant or increases in tandem,40 Conversely, falling prices—due to 
the availability of a newly legal supply of ivory, for instance—may not have the 
depressing effect on demand that economic models would predict. An increase in price, 
therefore, spurs more poaching and may in fact drive demand as well. The more valuable 
and difficult to obtain a product is, the greater the perceived value. While rising prices 
might prohibit some marginal consumers from buying, quickly rising incomes in Asia 
allow more and more potential consumers access, especially as relative incomes in Africa 
drop. This supports the argument against a controlled legal trade, which, due to 
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elephants’ long gestation periods and weak enforcement along the supply chain, would 
likely only fuel demand and lead to sharper declines in elephant populations. 
Consumer Groups 
Though motivations for ivory consumption can vary substantially between 
individuals, past research has shed light on certain common factors between consumers at 
national and international levels. In a 2015 Asia-wide survey of consumers, National 
Geographic and Globescan discovered that 22 percent of respondents were likely buyers, 
and that they typically described themselves as “fashionable, social, and religious.”41 A 
2015 survey of 1,000 urban “opinion influencers” by The Nature Conservancy showed 
this number increases to 35 percent within the millennial generation.42 The research 
shows Chinese ivory consumers tend to be younger, somewhat better educated, have a 
religious or spiritual inclination, and fall within the middle-income bracket.43 Those who 
reject ivory consumption, on the other hand, tend to be older, less well off, and less 
educated.44 This suggests that education campaigns alone will do little to dissuade a 
growing number of consumers who are already aware of the poaching crisis in Africa 
from buying ivory products.  
There is a stark divide between attitudes towards ivory consumption and support 
for ivory market regulation. Previous survey results show that ivory consumers are as 
likely as non-consumers to understand and be concerned with the impacts of the trade on 
elephants.46 Both Chinese buyers and non-buyers were also much more likely to support 
                                                
41 National Geographic & Globescan. Reducing Demand for Ivory: 3. 
42 The Nature Conservancy, “Curbing Ivory Consumption in China,” The Nature Conservancy. Accessed: 
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44 Ibid. 
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a total ban on domestic ivory sales than not (67% versus 79%).47 National Geographic 
found three additional factors to be correlated with Chinese demand: the idea that 
individual consumption has little impact on demand, that real and fake ivory can be easily 
distinguished, and that ivory will soon be impossible to acquire legally.48 Many Chinese 
consumers understand the impact of the trade, but until now, have justified consumption 
in terms of its legality.49 “Protection according to the law” and “selective protection” are 
policies that enjoy increasing support in China among wildlife consumers, but also build 
in a rationale for continued consumption.50 Traditionally in China, there exists a tendency 
to rely on government intervention as a catalyst for social and political change, 
downplaying the significance of individual action. This attitude places the onus of 
demand reduction and conservation on the government and has the effect of exempting 
consumers from responsibility for their own actions. This way of thinking is problematic 
and can lead to justifying a wide range of socially detrimental behaviors. It also 
highlights the importance of greater policy clarity and consistency from the Chinese 
government. 60% of urban residents surveyed stated only “little” understanding about 
Chinese domestic ivory regulations.51 Equally problematic is a potential surge in demand 
from buyers in the lead up to the complete ban, especially since the government has 
decided to do it in phases over the course of 2017. Ban implementation and preliminary 
effects on demand are discussed in the following chapter.  
Another group of concern is international travelers who may come in contact with 
ivory abroad or travel abroad with the intent of buying wildlife that is more strictly 
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controlled in China. Chinese who travel abroad and are thus exposed to wildlife 
trafficking in countries with laxer laws risk potentially becoming traffickers themselves.52  
Hong Kong, now believed to have the largest market for ivory of any city in the world, 
has become a popular destination for mainlanders seeking to buy luxury goods including 
wildlife.  It is believed that over 90% of Hong Kong ivory products are sold to mainland 
visitors and smuggled back into China illegally.53 Laxer penalties for ivory trafficking in 
Hong Kong along with weak customs enforcement at the border have exacerbated the 
flow of illegal ivory into the mainland.54 Further complicating matters, despite constant 
petitioning from wildlife groups, the Hong Kong government has announced it will not 
close its legal ivory market until 2021.55 Discrepancies between laws on the mainland and 
in Hong Kong will likely have the effect of transplanting demand. Similar problems of 
ineffective enforcement and open markets exist across Southeast Asia, emphasizing the 
need for demand reduction in China, regardless of the ban. 
What We Don’t Know  
The above profile of demand for ivory in China forms the theoretical basis for the 
experiment presented in the third section of this report. Although much research has been 
devoted to understanding the profile of the ivory of consumer in China and elsewhere, 
there is a dearth of experimental research into understanding how to influence ivory 
consumption behavior. Identifying past and potential ivory consumers is just the first 
piece of the puzzle. Demand is fluid after all, not static. It is a dialectic process between 
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an individual and society, set within certain economic constraints. It is not enough to 
observe what a consumer looks like. What is needed is a better understanding of that 
consumer’s motivations and how those motivations can be altered to dissuade future 
consumption. This is the jumping off point for this report’s experimental survey, which 
tests how potential ivory consumers react to different types of conservation messaging by 
measuring variation in responses to questions about consumption habits and attitudes 
following a specific treatment. This exploratory work seeks to answer a host of questions: 
what messaging proves most effective in altering how people respond to questions about 
their consumption behavior and attitudes towards conservation efforts? Which subgroups 
of the population are more or less persuadable with conservation messaging? How do 
demographic variables such as income, education, and age influence the efficacy of 
messaging? How do the treatments effect attitudes towards conservation and can these 
messages be used to stimulate social and political action? Section three seeks to shed 
light on these questions and raises many more. 
Identifying Consumers to Influence  
The NGO and conservation community must identify past and potential 
consumers most capable of being persuaded by information campaigns if they are to 
better tailor messages and conserve valuable resources. The Nature Conservancy 
identified 40% of their sample as “persuadable,” half of whom are under 40 years of age 
and two-thirds of which are in the upper middle class.56 Those who are “persuadable” 
could have imperfect knowledge of domestic legislation, the impacts of the ivory trade on 
wildlife and humans, or simply remain unconvinced by current conservation campaigns. 
Researcher Ana Elena Ramirez Corte suggests information campaigns should target 
                                                
56 The Nature Conservancy. “Curbing Ivory Consumption in China.” 
 19 
potential consumers that are “negative-attitude, positive-behavior,” meaning those that 
are non-buyers only due to circumstance—financial or otherwise—and may become 
active consumers should the opportunity arise.57 Those who exhibit a positive 
conservation attitude but a negative behavior (that is continue buying ivory) pose a 
problem for conservation organizations. It is possible that demand for ivory within this 
group can only be effectively reduced through market regulation and the threat of 
punishment. Consumer groups that may be more effectively swayed (and by which types 
of policy action) is covered in detail in the survey results section.   
It is important that messaging efforts be tailored to fit specific groups of 
consumers and be presented in culturally specific frames. Some consumers may be more 
easily swayed by clear and unequivocal legal restrictions on ivory, while others may be 
more responsive to conservation oriented messaging. Since ivory still occupies an 
important cultural and spiritual position, some consumers may be persuaded to replace 
ivory with an equally important material that represents those same values—such as the 
seeds of the Bodhi tree, already widely popular in China as representative of Buddhist 
enlightenment. Public awareness campaigns, which until recently have focused on 
negative reinforcement, could be supplemented with positive messaging that avoids 
shaming and guilt. These feelings can trigger defense mechanisms in consumers that can 
effectively undercut attempts at true behavior change,58 especially if the messaging 
comes from foreign organizations. While shaming may be effective if it comes from 
peers, it may also be important to offer consumers a way to satisfy their particular needs 
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for social and cultural connection, rather than severing those connections by attempting 
to impose Western notions of conservation ethics.59 Experimental testing on the efficacy 
of positive messaging, however, is beyond the scope of this report. 
The messenger can be equally relevant to the strength of the message. Renowned 
international figures such as Britain’s Prince William and sports celebrity Yao Ming have 
appeared in campaigns to reduce ivory consumption in China. Some consumers may 
respond to official announcements, and others may be more susceptible to celebrity 
ambassadors. What is needed are key opinion leaders who have a strong personal 
connection to and common ground with the specific social groups who are most likely to 
buy ivory. The next section also provides a brief history of western-led conservation 
campaigns in China, a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses, and potential 
improvements for future public education campaigns. 
Conclusion 
The multifarious origins of demand for a product like ivory, that is itself 
surrounded in misinformation, are difficult to parse out. In China today, ivory occupies a 
tenuous position between a source of cultural prestige and one of social stigma. A 
growing understanding amongst the Chinese middle and upper classes of the nature of the 
ivory trade and its impacts has only added to its contested position and complicated the 
current understanding of demand. Growing awareness has at times led to shame, guilt and 
subsequent dishonesty, which can create a huge amount of noise and imprecision in the 
research process. It is very difficult to ascertain definitively whether or not respondents 
are being truthful about their attitudes towards ivory. This is not to discourage the pursuit 
of a better understanding of the cultural, economic, and psychological correlates of 
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demand for ivory. Quite the contrary, it is meant to encourage greater in-depth research. 
It is essential to understand whether information campaigns are having their intended 
effect or are instead backfiring, undercutting conservation efforts by hardening negative 
attitudes and driving demand underground. There is a pressing need for both broad-based 
surveys as well as more targeted focus group and interview-based research into demand 
in order to hone in on those commonalities between individual consumers and across 
social strata.  
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II: The Party, Civil Society & Conservation 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, a flurry of news reports surfaced implicating President Xi Jinping’s 
entourage of smuggling illegal ivory aboard his plane during and official state visit to 
Tanzania.60 Other investigations have tied Chinese naval officers to ivory smuggling 
between ports in Eastern Africa and China.61 Although the veracity of these reports is 
difficult to confirm definitively, the implications are grave. Not only does this bely 
ulterior political motives in China’s recent pro-conservation overtures in African 
countries, it also implies a potential vested interest in continued exploitation of elephant 
ivory by certain politically influential people. Neither of these implications is reassuring 
and both complicate interpretations of recent commitments to the closure of the domestic 
ivory market. There are good reasons, however, to be hopeful. China has some of the 
world’s strongest criminal penalties for wildlife trafficking and its commitment to 
controlling the illegal trade is consistent and strong. Its implementation of the initial 
stages of a ban on domestic ivory in March reaffirms commitments made between 
presidents Xi and Obama in 2015 and sends a strong message to the international 
community that China is dedicated to the prohibition of commercial ivory.  
Promises made by high ranking officials are just the beginning, however, and 
though President Xi’s carry considerable weight in China, a complicated political 
landscape and an under-informed and under-mobilized polity can pose serious obstacles 
to implementing new policy. China’s human-centric environmental legislation, imperfect 
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enforcement record, and complex bureaucratic hierarchy—where responsibility and 
authority are divided both horizontally and vertically—can slow progress to a halt if there 
is insufficient pressure from both the political elite and the grassroots. This chapter 
examines the successes so far and the obstacles that still remain for the closure of China’s 
ivory markets, legal and illegal.  
CHINA’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
In 1981, China ratified the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES), the first multilateral environmental treaty it had ever joined.62 Today 
the CITES management authority of China is one of the world’s largest, with 22 offices 
and 130 staff members across the mainland.63 China has also participated in all three 
COBRA operations, international law enforcement stings that achieved notable successes 
at targeting wildlife trafficking crimes. The evolution of China’s domestic wildlife 
legislation can be understood as an incremental recalibration meant to reflect the 
changing environmental priorities of its people as well as its evolving role on the global 
stage. The nature of China’s decentralized authoritarianism, however, means that central 
government mandates can look quite different from locality to locality upon 
implementation. Misaligned incentives and information asymmetries between central and 
local officials are significant obstacles to combatting environmental crime.  
The Ivory Ban 
On March 24th of this year, China’s State Forestry Administration publicly 
announced that within a week, 67 of China’s 172 licensed carving facilities and retail 
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outlets would be shut down, with the remaining to close by the end of the year.64 Along 
with the notice were posted the names and information for each of the businesses and 
their dates of closure.65 This historic decision by no means happened overnight. It took 
months of negotiation and hard work by the NGO community, academics, and 
government agencies within China and abroad. Stakeholders had to be consulted, 
implementation schedules and processes planned, and contingencies discussed. 
Furthermore, the importance of high-level government-to-government dialogue in giving 
momentum to the ban cannot be understated. Aster Zhang, of Beijing Normal University, 
who worked closely on the ban in the years prior to its announcement, says international 
political pressure and visits from foreign dignitaries were crucial in moving the ban into 
its final stages.66 The British royal family, for one, has made conservation and fighting 
wildlife trafficking one of its pet causes. Over the last few years Prince William has made 
numerous visits to China and appeals to the government to support efforts to control 
ivory trafficking with significant successes, including a one-year import ban imposed 
shortly before his visit to an elephant sanctuary there.67 Furthermore, the mounting 
negative publicity generated by ivory poaching and soaring Chinese demand both 
internationally and within China reached a critical point and could no longer be ignored. 
The Communist Party’s interest in maintaining its international reputation also played a 
vital role in the decision to begin implementing the ban earlier this year. 
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The most recent ban also built off a history of partial bans and increased 
regulations on the domestic ivory market that, while doing little to curb demand on their 
own, contributed to the understanding of how a successful ban could be implemented. In 
February 2015, the Chinese government introduced a one-year moratorium on the import 
of ivory carvings from Africa produced after the 1975 CITES trade ban—already illegal 
by international law—to assess the effects of a ban.68 This temporary moratorium was 
criticized by the NGO the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) for being 
“window-dressing,” as it did nothing to address the massive, poorly regulated domestic 
ivory market.69 In March 2016, the one-year ban was expanded to include pre-convention 
ivory (all ivory acquired prior to the CITES 1975 ban) and extended until the end of 
2019.70 This reflected an understanding that, as long as pre-ban ivory continued to enter 
China, illegal ivory would continue along with it. Under the temporary ban, ‘non-
commercial’ ivory, loosely defined as objects meant for “public exhibition, scientific 
exchange, and cultural research,” could still be imported legally.71 Although the ban 
extensions were meant to signal a stronger commitment to conservation in China, these 
potential loopholes and an open domestic market created legal ambiguity and an easily 
exploitable gray market. 
The 2017 ban on domestic ivory is unequivocal in its commitment to “phase out 
commercial processing and sale of ivory and ivory products,” but much of the language 
                                                
68 Xinhua News. “China imposes one-year ban on ivory carvings imports.” Xinhua. 25 February 2015. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-02/26/c_134021380.htm. (Accessed: 3 March 2017). 
69 Environmental Investigation Agency, “China’s Carved Ivory Import Ban ‘Largely Window-Dressing,’” 
EIA International, February 27, 2015, https://eia-international.org/chinas-carved-ivory-import-ban-largely-
window-dressing. 
70 Su Zhou. “Import Ban on Ivory Expanded.” China Daily. 23 March 2016. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-03/23/content_24027678.htm. (Accessed: 3 March 2017). 
71 Ibid. 
 26 
in the text remains ambiguous.72 No processing or sales of ivory will continue past 
December 31st 2017, except for non-profit organizations that are permitted to continue 
non-commercial “heritage research” in carving techniques.73 The single exception to the 
commercial ban is one made for the auctioning of legally sourced ivory relics “under 
strict monitoring after administrative approval.”74 The document does not specify either 
in what quantities this ivory will be auctioned, nor what agencies will be tasked with 
overseeing them and ensuring strict adherence to the law. The Wildlife Conservation 
Society’s (WCS) Aili Kang notes the importance of establishing how this “possible 
loophole” will be controlled and how government owned stockpiles will be managed for 
the new, more narrowly defined purposes.75 The document calls on “all provincial, 
autonomous regional and municipal governments and relevant departments [to] take a 
leading role in the division of responsibilities,” but gives no guidance on how this 
division should be achieved.76 China’s national and regional bureaucracies operate in a 
complicated network that is at once hierarchical horizontally and vertically. If it is to be 
left to the provincial governments to divide up responsibilities, it remains to be seen how 
inter-regional enforcement and coordination will be conducted. The potential for buck-
passing and conflicts over authority are significant and will need to be addressed through 
more specific legislation at the provincial and local levels. 
                                                
72 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “A Notice by the General Office of State Council on 
the Orderly Cessation of Commercial Processing and Sale of Ivory and Ivory Products.” Translated by 
Wildlife Conservation Society. WCS Newsroom. 3 January 2016. https://newsroom.wcs.org/News-
Releases/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/9578/China-Announcement-of-Domestic-Ivory-Ban-in-2017--
English-Translation.aspx. (Accessed: 8 February 2017). 
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid. 
75 Aili Kang, “China’s Ivory Ban Has Played a Significant Role in De-Valuing Ivory.” National 
Geographic Society (Blogs). 31 March 2017. http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2017/03/31/chinas-
ivory-ban-has-played-a-significant-role-in-de-valuing-ivory/. (Accessed: 25 May 2017). 
76 “A Notice by the General Office of State Council…” WCS Newsroom. 
 27 
The ban’s importance can not be understated, both for its symbolic weight as a 
signal to the international community and transnational organized crime, and for a 
number of practical benefits that can, if enforced properly, lead to a significant reduction 
in ivory consumption in China. Not only does the ban send a strong signal to the public 
that all consumption is illegal, but it also makes enforcement easier, as officers need not 
distinguish between pre-ban and post-ban ivory products.77 Yannick Kuehl, regional 
director of Traffic East Asia, feels that the Chinese government is well positioned to 
enforce a domestic market ban, both because the political will now exists at the highest 
levels, and because of a greater capacity for intra-agency coordination at regional and 
local levels than exists in federalist systems like the United States.78 Though it is true that 
political expediency does favor single-party regimes, policy at the central level and its 
implementation at the regional and local levels can look quite different once filtered 
through the multiple levels of bureaucracy. Ambiguous laws and inconsistent 
enforcement further weaken the signal strength of a domestic ban and must continue to be 
updated to show a strong, unflinching commitment to conservation. For its part, the 
Chinese government is continuing a strong enforcement campaign against illegal ivory 
and is working to raise awareness of trafficking crimes amongst its citizens, especially 
those most likely to come in contact with illegal products, such as international travelers.  
Although it is still too soon to draw conclusions about the ban’s impact on 
Chinese demand, initial market research shows a drop in prices beginning in 2015 and 
continuing through early 2017. Between Spring 2016 and Spring 2017, the median price 
for worked ivory in Guangzhou, a hub for the illegal wildlife trade, fell from 3,059 
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USD/kg to 2,238 USD/kg.79 Outside of China, less regulated and rapidly growing 
markets like Vietnam also saw tentative declines from a high 1,322 USD/kg in 2015 to 
660 USD/kg in February of this year.80 Vietnamese traders are now warier of trading to 
Chinese clients for fear of harsh penalties if they are caught.81 WCS’s Aili Kang warns 
against drawing conclusions about price swings in China’s ivory market without long-
term monitoring, as they have been inconsistent across different platforms and among 
different categories of products.82 Since early 2016, while prices for smaller, more easily 
found items such as trinkets and jewelry dropped, prices for larger fine art pieces were 
less predictable and are more difficult to track generally.83 Similarly, while prices in the 
physical market did decline, prices for online listings have remained more consistent over 
the same period.84 Reasons for this fluctuation in price are also subject to debate. 
Structural factors such as declining levels of economic growth and luxury consumption in 
China likely account for a significant part. A price drop may also be the result of a 
temporary glut in the supply rather than ebbing demand. It is also possible that vendors 
are slashing prices in advance of the impending ban to move as much of their remaining 
stock as possible before the end of the year.  
It remains to be seen whether these prices changes prove to be a permanent trend 
or are rather signs of a temporary market readjustment. One concern is whether or not 
buyers and sellers in the legal market will shift to the black market, simply transplanting 
existing demand. Because the market is still partially open, it is too soon to say. 
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Furthermore, while prices in Asia may show preliminary signs of decline, the rates of 
poaching have not experienced a similar trend. Poaching has remained relatively constant 
since 2013 and is still well above threshold levels.85 It is imperative that NGOs and 
government agencies keep a close eye on prices in both the legal and illegal markets 
through the end of this year and beyond to better understand the follow-on effects of the 
ban. 
China’s Wildlife Trafficking Laws  
 Few countries can match the severity of China’s punitive measures for wildlife 
crime. Poaching the highly protected Giant Panda, for example, is punishable by death. 
Inconsistent application and a vague legal code, however, can hamper comprehensive 
enforcement. Until a revision that took effect at the beginning of 2017, the protection of 
China’s wildlife was carried out under an outdated law that had remained essentially 
unchanged since 1988. Although the Wildlife Protection Law provides detailed punitive 
measures for relevant crimes, it also emphasized the human use of wildlife and prioritized 
the management, domestication and breeding of wildlife for commercial purposes.86 It 
provided detailed information on the taxing of business revenue and the collection of 
duties, but did little to discourage the perception of wildlife as a commodity. The 
protection for utilization contradiction not only sent mixed messages to the public, but 
has also led to a number of practical obstacles to effective enforcement. The inclusion of 
one species to the register of protected species could, in effect, lead to increased illegal 
capture and speculation by traders for commercial breeding, which would endanger the 
survival of that species.87 This could have the effect of inflating consumer demand for an 
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increasingly rare and prized wildlife product. Additionally, state sanctioned wildlife 
farming could incentivize the illegal capture and farming of wildlife for commercial use, 
further threatening wild populations. 
 The 2016 revised version of the wildlife law, while it does somewhat de-
emphasize the human use aspect of the original law, still leaves much to be desired. 
Article 27 of the new law prohibits the sale and consumption of wildlife under “special 
state protection,” but again makes broad exemptions for “scientific research, captive 
breeding, public exhibition or performances, heritage conservation or other special 
purposes,” pending municipal government approval.88 Furthermore, the differentiation 
between “special state protection” and “special local protection” could lead to conflicting 
laws at the local and national level. One positive change in the new law establishes 
liability for any individual or business involved in the production or sale of protected 
wildlife at any point in the supply chain. Articles 31, 32, and 33 prohibit the publishing of 
advertisements for, the provision of trading platforms (including e-commerce websites) 
for, and the unlicensed shipment of protected wildlife or wildlife products.89 The revised 
law also provides for higher levels of government to address negligence or willful 
defiance of the statutes of the law by local officials.90 In addition to civil and criminal 
penalties (including for the forgery of licenses and documents), the new law also 
mandates the confiscation of “all unlawful income,” language that reflects similar money 
laundering and racketeering statutes in the 2016 Global Anti-Poaching Act passed by the 
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United States Congress.91 The EIA, however, released a statement criticizing the revised 
law for doing too little to regulate the farming of endangered species and further 
promoting the “commodification” of wildlife in China.92 While some progress has been 
made, the lack of regulations and protections for captive-bred wildlife and the loopholes 
this provides for laundering wild animals through the industry are troubling. Furthermore, 
the vague exceptions to the ‘commercial use’ prohibition will make it exceedingly 
difficult for enforcement agencies to control how captive-bred wildlife is sold and 
utilized. Finally, while unlicensed commercial transactions are punishable under the law, 
illegal possession is not addressed. 
 There are a number of other laws employed in the prosecution of wildlife 
poaching and smuggling as well as the management of lawful import and export. Article 
341 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China is used to prosecuted all 
crimes relating to the poaching, sale, and purchase of wildlife and wildlife products: 
 
Those who illegally hunt and kill rare and endangered wild animals which are under the state key 
production plan or illegally purchase, transport or sell those rare and endangered wild animals and 
their manufactured products are to be sentenced to not more than five years of fixed-term 
imprisonment or criminal detention, and may in addition be sentenced to a fine. In serious cases, 
those law offenders are to be sentenced to not less than five years and not more than 10 years of 
fixed-term imprisonment, and may in addition be sentenced to a fine. In especially serious cases, 
those law offenders are to be sentenced to more than 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment, and in 
addition be sentenced to a fine and confiscation of their properties.93 
The seriousness of the case is determined on an individual basis and is largely left to the 
discretion of the courts. The Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Administration of the Import and Export of Endangered Wild Fauna and Flora, 
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promulgated in 2006, empowers the administrative agencies of the fisheries and forestry 
departments to oversee the import and export of wildlife and maintain compliance with 
CITES.94 This regulation prohibits the import or export of any wildlife prohibited by 
CITES except in cases such as “scientific research, domestication and propagation, 
artificial cultivation, and cultural exchange,” and for which a proper permit has been 
issued by the relevant department.95 The law requires specific documentation for 
licensing, establishes the application process, and makes clear the rules for handling the 
products. Much as the Wildlife Law above, however, its vague exemptions leave 
potential loopholes open and may lead to inconsistent enforcement. 
Law Enforcement: Successes and Failures 
China’s laws, though far from perfect, provide a strong framework by which to 
monitor and prosecute wildlife crime. The reality on the ground, however, is more 
difficult to control. A combination of inconsistent enforcement and legal loopholes have 
contributed to a market that is much more unregulated in practice than on paper. Lack of 
funding and training for law enforcement has left agents ill-equipped to prevent the black 
market from infiltrating the legal wildlife trade. A problematic ivory registration and 
certification system has made it easy for unscrupulous traders to circumvent lax 
enforcement. In 1999, of 236 trafficking cases, only 15 people were detained and four 
sentenced.96 Though progress has been made, only a small minority of trafficking cases 
are prosecuted and long prison sentences are rare.  
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Prior to the ban, a problematic ivory certification system made differentiating 
between legal and illegal ivory difficult for consumers and enforcers alike, and allowed 
dishonest dealers to launder illegally obtained ivory into the legal market. In a series of 
investigations, NGOs EIA and the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) 
detailed the ways in which a large number of ivory processing and sales outlets have 
flouted national laws on proper licensing and certification procedures. Of the facilities 
surveyed by IFAW, 60 percent were found to be laundering illegal ivory and 63 percent 
did not display the certification for ivory products required by law.97 In a survey of 
dealers in Guangzhou in Southern China, EIA found that as much as 90 percent of the 
ivory for sale came from illegal sources, and some sellers even shared information on 
how to smuggle ivory with their customers.98 Under Chinese law, all ivory pieces of 
greater than 50 grams must be accompanied by a legal certificate and photograph of the 
product. Many of these certificates were either being reused for multiple different pieces, 
forged by the dealers, or absent altogether. 
The online illegal market poses a particular challenge for law enforcement and 
conservation NGOs in China. As enforcement operations against brick-and-mortar ivory 
sellers have increased over the years, much of the black market has moved onto the 
growing number of online retail and social media platforms. Conducting business online, 
dealers have the benefit of relative secrecy and anonymity. The NGO Traffic has found 
that as much as 50 percent of the wildlife products sold illegally online in China are ivory 
and they are being advertised under at least 64 different code words to evade detection.99 
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In 2012, after law enforcement increased its crackdown on online sales and 15 of China’s 
largest e-commerce companies pledged to remove all illegal wildlife listings, an 
increasing amount of this business moved onto social media platforms, making it even 
more difficult to track.100 Between 2014 and the end of 2016, ivory postings increased to 
63 percent of total wildlife products being sold through social media, while overall 
wildlife listings fell steadily over the same period.101 It is impossible to know, however, 
what percentage of the entire online market this sample represents or which traders 
continued to evade detection with a different set of code words or within restricted online 
communities. In a major positive move, in 2015 China’s largest social media provider 
Tencent, with more than 650 million users, agreed to begin monitoring wildlife 
trafficking on its platforms.102 Aside from a few high profile cases, however, many of 
these online dealers escape criminal punishment only to begin selling again on a different 
site or under a different profile. Even with the revised wildlife law and its extension of 
criminal liability to e-commerce sites and couriers, comprehensive supervision and 
enforcement remain a daunting task for law enforcement in China, where everyday 
millions of online transactions take place. 
Both in the interest of highly publicized operations and due to a lack of sufficient 
funding and staff for sustained efforts, one-off enforcement stings are effective less for 
their arrest count and more for their signaling power. Between 2014 and 2015, the SFA 
carried out three such operations, “Alarm Bell,” which targeted ivory processors 
operating illegally, “Skynet” and “Swords,” which focused on wildlife traffickers in 
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general.103 China also publically destroyed two ivory stockpiles during the same period, 
the first of 6.1 tons in 2014, and the second of 662 kg in 2015.104 Major busts and 
subsequent publicizing through media reports and targeted advertisements is an effective 
way to educate the public of the criminality of the ivory trade as well as to discourage 
risk-averse potential offenders. Along with numerous advertisements in international 
airports across China, the SFA has announced it would send text messages to all 
international travelers detailing the legal implications of importing products such as 
elephant ivory and rhino horn.105 
In the international arena, China has made a concerted effort to collaborate with 
other nations and be seen as a leader on wildlife trafficking enforcement.  It has signed a 
number of memorandums of understanding with its Southeast Asian neighbors and 
partners in Africa (see table below). Since 2013, China has taken a central role in all three  
China’s Wildlife Trafficking MOUs 
Signatories Agreement Type Agreement Goals 
China, ASEAN, ASEAN 
Wildlife Enforcement 
Network (WEN) (2004, 
2009) 
MOU on Combatting 
Wildlife Trafficking, 
MOU on Non-traditional 
Security Issues 
Encourages information exchange, 
training and personnel exchange, law 
enforcement cooperation, joint research 
China, Indonesia (2015) MOU on Wildlife 
Trafficking 
Increases collaboration on enforcement 
and increases legal trade of wildlife 
China, Laos (2014, 
2009) 
MOU on cross-border 
conservation, MOU to 
establish Joint Border 
Commission 
Conservation of cross-border nature 
preserves, joint patrols, annual meetings, 
community conservation training, etc. 
China, Nepal  MOU on Environment 
and Biodiversity 
Conservation, focus on 
illicit trade in tiger parts 
Aims to designate focal points for border 
checkpoints, increase information 
sharing, cooperation on seizures, increase 
surveillance on wildlife trade routes, 
supports establishment of local level anti-
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poaching units 
ASEAN, China, India, 
Japan, Korea, Russia, 
Australia, New Zealand 
(signed 2014) 
East Asia Summit 
Declaration on 
Combating Wildlife 
Trafficking 
Reaffirms commitments to international 
agreements (CITES, CBD), calls for: 
coordinated regional law enforcement, 
integration of national environmental and 
regional crime laws, standardization of 
regulations, exchanges of information, 
the development of national level 
taskforces and WENs with linkages to 
international networks 
China, Vietnam (2015) MOU on Wildlife 
Protection 
Aims to enhance information sharing on 
trafficked wildlife between CITES 
management authorities, border law 
enforcement, captive breeding of species, 
and public awareness campaigns. 
China, South Africa 
(2013) 
MOU on Wetland and 
Desert Ecosystems and 
Wildlife Conservation 
Aimed at ensuring compliance with 
relevant international conventions and 
increase law enforcement cooperation to 
control rhino poaching. 
China, Kenya (2013) MOU on Cooperation in 
the Fields of Forestry and 
Ecological Conservation  
Emphasizes scientific exchanges and 
infrastructure development as well as 
provision of equipment and resources for 
on the ground conservation in Kenya. 
The above list, though far from comprehensive, shows encouraging examples of China’s willingness to 
cooperate with other countries and take a greater role in bilateral and multilateral institutions. Many of the 
agreements are strictly voluntary and lack the ‘teeth’ needed to ensure compliance among signatories. A 
worrying reoccurrence is a focus, again, on strengthening captive breeding programs and legal trade in 
wildlife, which can undercut efforts to combat illegal trade. These agreements are important first steps to 
establishing regular communication and information exchanges, but must be followed up in earnest with 
sustained efforts to control transnational wildlife crime. 
Cobra operations, large-scale multilateral law enforcement stings organized through the 
International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime, CITES, and Interpol among 
other multilateral organizations. All three operations were hailed as successes. Operation 
Cobra II led to over 400 arrests and the seizure of three tons of ivory products.106 The 
most recent, 2015’s Operation Cobra III, tallied 139 arrests and 247 seizures of 
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everything from ivory to endangered plant products.107 The Chinese government seeks to 
present itself an international leader and, over the years, has taken a greater role in high-
profile multilateral operations in areas such as law enforcement and peacekeeping. These 
relatively low-cost, one-off operations can help China improve its soft power standing in 
the world and build its reputation as an active player in international efforts. In recent 
years, China has also placed greater emphasis on establishing cross-border cooperation 
on counter-trafficking with its Southeast Asian neighbors, many of whom have much less 
regulated wildlife markets and with whom China shares long, porous borders. China has 
also participated actively in ASEAN environmental summits, regional action plans, and 
multilateral efforts—even though it does not have member status—in an attempt to take a 
greater role in leading Southeast Asian development and security.  
In spite of recent efforts and what some might consider draconian legislation, 
environmental crime—and specifically wildlife crime—remains a relatively low priority 
amongst Chinese enforcement agencies. Lack of adequate funding for agencies and 
insufficient training for officers remain significant obstacles to effective enforcement.108 
Much of the burden of funding is left to regional and local governments, and those with 
greatest natural resources are often the most strapped for cash.109 Even with the 
aforementioned regulations in place and a greater emphasis on controlling wildlife crime, 
it is estimated that as much as 90 percent of ivory purchased domestically in China is 
illegal.110 The burden on law enforcement, the rapid growth of an online black market, 
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and the legal loopholes in domestic policies facilitate the growth of a massive gray 
market for wildlife products. It still remains to be seen how the ban will affect the black 
market in China. The once legal trader might be driven underground, or conversely, 
marginal buyers now more acutely aware of the legal implications of purchasing ivory, 
may be dissuading from buying in the future. What is clear is that the announcement of 
the ban is merely the first step in a long process of shutting down the legal carving and 
sales industries, clamping down on online black markets, and educating the Chinese 
public on the legal and ethical implications of ivory consumption. 
Central Government Policy: The Principal-Agent Problem 
To understand the obstacles to policy implementation, one must understand the 
preceding policy developments in the context of the bureaucratic structure of the Chinese 
state. Principal-Agent Theory details how information asymmetries and conflicting 
incentives between central government and regional officials lead to inefficiency and, at 
times, willful disobedience at successive levels of government. An agent (local official), 
benefiting from information the principal (central government) lacks, will pursue his own 
interests at the cost of following central government mandates.111 The theory describes 
any organizational system, from a multinational company to a government bureaucracy, 
but is particularly relevant to a rigidly hierarchical authoritarian state like China. In 
China’s centralized system, a relatively small central government drafts vague policy 
mandates that are modified at each successive level of the bureaucracy down to local 
governments, which must also allocate the necessary budget resources. At each level, this 
‘fragmented authoritarianism’ amplifies the principal-agent problems, allowing for 
                                                
111 Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. 
Princeton University Press: 2001.  
 39 
inefficiency and graft due to conflicting self-interests and policy goals.112 This 
phenomenon is particularly worrisome for environmental initiatives, which are often 
sidelined for more measurable and politically expedient goals such as economic 
growth.113 
As long as incentives to ignore central government policy outweigh the risks of 
noncompliance, local level officials will continue to pursue their own self-interests.114 
One strategy available to a resource-strapped and understaffed central government has 
been periodic heavy-handed crackdowns on official corruption.115 This is meant to 
increase the cost of noncompliance to such an unacceptably high level in a few cases so 
as to dissuade future malfeasance. Some scholars view the Chinese government’s 
indistinct legal boundaries and mixed signals as advantageous in controlling a vast 
bureaucracy through fear of harsh, unpredictable reprisals.116 However, the lack of 
independent courts or an independent authority tasked with monitoring and punishing 
corruption impedes consistent enforcement.117 Furthermore, acknowledging that there is 
corruption at any level of government tarnishes the Party as a whole and means these 
cases are likely to go underreported.118 More and more, the role of environmental 
watchdog has fallen to those outside government. Social sanctions imposed by non-
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governmental organizations, journalists, and private citizens can help to reduce the 
incentives to illegal behavior and the under-provision public goods such as environmental 
protection.119  
The Chinese Communist Party’s continued survival rests on the regime’s 
perceived legitimacy among its citizens and, to a lesser extent, the international 
community. Many of the incremental political and economic reforms begun in the 1980s 
and continuing to today can be understood in this frame. In the interest of maintaining 
social stability and advancing China’s position in the world, the Party has shifted focus 
from the ideological campaigns of the Mao era to a growth-oriented planned economy 
under ‘reform and opening up.’ For much of the past 40 years, the key to that legitimacy 
lay in consistent and rapid economic development. That has expanded considerably over 
the last ten years to include all manner of social welfare and environmental issues as well. 
Largely in response to protests over increasing numbers of pollution-related 
environmental disasters, the central government has begun mandating ‘hard’ targets for 
provincial governments in pollution abatement and increasing penalties for 
noncompliance.120 Interpretation and implementation of these general mandates, 
however, is left to the discretion of provincial and municipal offices of the Environmental 
Protection Bureau (EPB). In a system known as tiao kuai, local level EPBs are 
simultaneously beholden vertically to the provincial EPB and horizontally to their 
corresponding state authority, which may have a very different set of policy objectives 
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and also controls the local EPB office’s funding.121 Local level officials, whose career 
advancement is often decided by narrow economic targets, can be unmotivated to 
undertake costly environmental abatement projects because of a lack of short-term 
returns and a need to inflate growth figures.122 In the context of wildlife trafficking, local 
level officials have been found to flout national laws, as wildlife sales and captive 
breeding programs can increase GPD figures.123 Conflicting incentives, official 
malfeasance, and difficulties in quantifying and monitoring environmental policy 
implementation have meant these efforts continue to take a back seat to boosting 
economic growth. 
The principal-agent problem can, in theory, be addressed by restructuring 
incentives for local officials by better aligning them with central government policy. 
Rather than focusing predominantly on GDP growth figures, evaluations can be modified 
to reflect a more holistic assessment of a cadre’s performance. Prior attempts to do this, 
such as the Chinese government’s effort to build environmental costs into GDP growth 
figures, were abandoned because of a lack of political will and the unexpectedly high 
financial costs of environmental degradation.124 Although the single figure “Green GDP” 
experiment failed, the willingness of Chinese officials at the highest levels to pioneer 
environmental accounting measures is significant. China’s Environmental Protection Law 
was revised in 2014 to include an oversight and demerit system for officials who violate 
or fail to enforce environmental regulations within their jurisdictions,125 but this system’s 
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implementation varies regionally and is typically reserved for the most egregious 
pollution cases. What is needed is a more nuanced cadre evaluation method that takes 
into account a wider range of environmental and social metrics along with economic 
growth so that local officials have greater incentives to pursue environmental programs.  
STRENGTHENING GRASSROOTS CONSERVATIONISM 
The obstacles to successfully solving environmental crises in China, let alone 
reducing its growing global footprint, are daunting: environmental agencies that are 
underfunded, understaffed, and subject to competing policy agendas and conflicting 
incentives at the national and subnational levels, an exploding population with its 
associated pollution problems and resource shortages, and a rapidly growing middle 
class— already larger than that of the United States—that has yet to fully come to terms 
with their responsibilities as global citizens. These incentive issues and the shortfall in 
capacity, however, can be mediated by individuals and institutions affiliated with or 
completely outside the government. In recent years, the Communist Party has turned to 
its citizens, media, and civil society groups to be observers and reporters in the area of 
environmental protection.126 The revised Environmental Protection Law allows private 
citizens to lodge official complaints of governmental negligence or corporate actions that 
lead to environmental damages and empowers registered non-governmental organizations 
to file legal suits for violations.127 The NGO community, both international and domestic, 
has become an important ally to government in providing technical support and public 
outreach for environmental issues. Media’s role as watchdog has been crucial in 
publicizing environmental crimes and providing a voice for disenfranchised victims and 
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concerned citizens. The Chinese government should continue to create an environment 
conducive to public participation and incentivize its citizens to take an active role in 
environmental protection both to increase its political legitimacy and to address shortfalls 
in capacity. 
This necessitates a motivated polity mobilized around environmental issues. As 
scholars have pointed out, China has yet to develop a broad-based environmental 
movement and its citizens often do not associated environmental trends with their 
personal lives.128 In many ways, the greater Chinese population has yet to understand 
their roles as global citizens. In order for a stronger sense of global conservationism to 
take hold in China, there is a very real need for citizens to re-imagine their community as 
something not defined by national boundaries, but by shared values as well a complex 
relationship to the land and its creatures. Zhang and Barr identify a need for citizens to 
establish “trans-local” networks built around common issues and reduce over-reliance on 
the state as the sole answer to their problems.129 Greater agency among citizens as 
overseers of their environment has been slow to develop in China, however. Consumers, 
likewise, must deepen their understanding of the products they consume and the 
processes and environmental costs involved in harvesting, manufacturing and shipping 
those products to them. The role of information cannot be under-estimated. At the same 
time, however, particular care must be given to how the public is educated and how the 
messages they receive are interpreted within a unique cultural and historical frame.  
Past Conservation Campaigns 
The conservation narrative in China, especially regarding wildlife trafficking, has 
traditionally been dominated by international NGOs and is therefore driven by liberal, 
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western ideals of environmental protection. On its face, there is nothing wrong with 
attempting to spread these ideals to different cultures and societies, but these efforts can, 
at times, meet with unintended consequences. In contrast to many Western countries, 
where conservationism has gestated for decades, China has only recently been exposed to 
these ideas. NGOs should not take Western sensibilities for granted when developing 
campaigns for Asian audiences. Furthermore, largely in response to what is perceived as 
ideological incursion, a growing group of Chinese skeptics have decried many NGO 
campaigns as yet another example of “the political and technical hegemony” of the 
West.130 Although it is unlikely that most Chinese take such a hostile view of these public 
awareness campaigns, the different cultural and historical frames through which they are 
interpreted must not be overlooked. More importantly, the particular people these 
campaigns seek to target—past and potential consumers—are likely to respond 
defensively to what they see as foreign criticism and moralizing over their behavior. The 
following section summarizes a number of these campaigns and provides options for 
improving future efforts. 
Campaigns to reduce demand for ivory in Asia have traditionally used messaging 
centered on the negative environmental and human impacts of poaching and the illegal 
ivory trade. “Say No to Ivory,” a 2013 campaign begun by WildAid, Save the Elephants, 
and the African Wildlife Fund, uses widely recognized celebrity ambassadors to spread 
messaging to Chinese audiences about the ivory trade through a variety of media 
including television, print advertisements, social media outlets, and public service 
announcements.131 Part of the campaign also includes an online pledge to refrain from 
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any future consumption of ivory and spread information about elephant poaching to 
friends and family. A survey a urban residents two years following the outset of 
campaign showed significant positive attitudinal changes, including a 51.5% increase in 
general awareness of elephant poaching and a 110.7% increase in the understanding that 
ivory comes from poached elephants among Beijing residents.132 Although it is 
impossible to assess how much of this attitudinal change is due to this specific campaign, 
greater coverage of elephant poaching in the Chinese news media and increased efforts 
devoted to public information campaigns by conservation organizations are having a 
noticeable effect, especially among urban Chinese residents. IFAW ran similar 
campaigns targeting ivory gifting culture in China as well as one ad depicting an elephant 
calf saying “Mom, I have teeth,” playing off the Chinese word for ivory ‘xiangya’ 
(‘elephant tooth’), an attempt to dispel the common misconception among Chinese that 
elephants simply lose their tusks naturally.133 
Another approach is to educate potential consumers about the laws surrounding 
wildlife trafficking and the potential legal risks a consumer incurs purchasing wildlife 
products. Two campaigns, the International Fund for Animal Welfare’s “Think Twice” 
campaign, and Traffic’s “Our Life our Wildlife—What is CITES?” program sought to 
specifically target international travelers most likely to come in contact with illegal 
wildlife products and educate them on CITES and unsustainable wildlife consumption.134 
The Chinese SFA has also issued public service announcements to international travelers 
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to inform them of the legal liability of returning to China with ivory or other wildlife 
products. Lishu Li of WCS China feels that even greater effort must be devoted by 
Chinese transnational companies, especially those operating in Africa, to educate their 
employees and discourage them from engaging in wildlife trafficking.135 Finally, 
developing specific awareness campaigns that focus on the recent ban and the specific 
legal risks associated with purchasing or selling ivory is essential. The following survey 
section shows that awareness, especially on policies and laws regulating the domestic 
ivory market, is still limited and strongly correlated with ivory consumption. 
A third strategy attempts to avoid stigmatizing consumers by focusing on the 
‘positive’ aspects of wildlife consumption in by addressing the source of the desire for 
products like ivory and rhino horn and the importance of these animals in Asian cultures. 
“The Power of Chi” campaign, led by WWF, TRAFFIC, the marketing organization PSI 
avoids using the common images of butchered rhinos to rouse feelings of guilt or shame 
in consumers.136 This more culturally sensitive approach relies on the use of traditional 
values and symbols to dissuade consumption. Powdered rhino horn is reputed to increase 
virility in men, strengthen the flow of ‘chi’ within the body, and even fight cancer in 
Vietnam. This campaign’s message focuses on persuading wealthier men that the strength 
of their ‘chi’ is inborn and cannot be increased by consuming wildlife products. Rather 
than a moralizing message about the evils on the rhino trade, this message calls on men to 
find confidence and strength within themselves, rather than from some magic tonic. 
Another campaign in Vietnam by Humane Society International also uses online social 
networks, businesses, and community organizations to disseminate messages about the 
                                                
135 Lishu Li. Interview by author. In-person interview. Guangzhou, China, 21 February 2017. 
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illegality of rhino horn and its lack of medicinal properties.137 In Thailand, one of the 
fastest growing ivory markets in Asia, WWF’s “Chor Chang” campaign called on 
celebrities and opinion leaders to drop Thai letter ‘chor’ from their names—also the first 
letter in the word for elephant, ‘chang’—in a gesture of solidarity with the world’s 
disappearing elephants.138 Rather than stigmatize consumers with gruesome imagery, this 
campaign focused on the importance of the elephant as a cultural symbol in Thailand.  
The success of any one of these campaigns in isolation is difficult to assess. The 
diversity of backgrounds and personal values among different ivory consumers even 
within the same community means that individuals may have vastly different reactions to 
the same campaign. To the extent possible, campaigns must be targeted to demographic 
groups based on previous exposure and the cultural and social motives for consumption. 
In the first phase, information campaigns that seek to educate the general population 
about the negative aspects of poaching, the ivory trade, and its illegality are necessary as 
a basis for demand reduction. It is safe to say that NGOs in China have achieved 
considerable success on this stage, at least among wealthier urban residents, those most 
likely to be ivory consumers. The crucial next stage must focus on the motives of 
consumption. Continued negative reinforcement may be insufficient to sway consumers 
who do not identify personally with moral arguments about poaching or the loss of 
biodiversity in Africa. Thought leaders, especially those recruited from the art collector 
community and among past ivory consumers, are likely to have developed networks of 
potential buyers and greater capacity to influence those individuals. To this end, WildAid 
has recruited a prominent Beijing antique dealer as its ambassador to the city’s elite 
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collectors for ivory demand reduction.139 Additionally, a successful campaign should 
present a clear, simple fact and an actionable message to its audience, constantly 
reinforced through networks of opinion leaders.140 Empowering audiences to take an 
active role in conservation through trusted local figures is a strategy that both non-
consumers motivated by conservation and consumers seeking to square past behavior 
with their consciences can engage in positively. Identifying those key consumer groups 
and motivating action on conservation will be addressed in the third section of this report. 
The Role of Civil Society 
 NGOs, journalists, and private citizens are much more than merely information 
disseminators. Professional organizations and academic institutions can provide much 
needed technical expertise and compensate for a lack of capacity in government agencies. 
Journalists and private citizens can actively monitor and publicize infractions of wildlife 
laws, creating a bridge between government and civil society built around cooperation 
and greater transparency. Research has shown that the Chinese people view greater 
inclusion of civil society groups in the public sector as increasing transparency and 
representativeness of environmental policies.141 The National Geographic Society and 
Globescan survey showed that respondents found non-profit organizations (80%) and 
scientists and academics (79%) to be the two most trusted sources of information on 
ivory issues.142 This trust, along with greater collaboration between non-governmental 
groups and government agencies, can help to bolster faith in the central government’s 
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capacity and willingness to address environmental issues, which is generally viewed 
poorly.143  
 The bureaucratic difficulties of establishing NGOs and their limited independence 
from the government present serious obstacles to operation in China. A restrictive foreign 
NGO law that came into effect in January 2017 put in place strict controls on foreign 
funding and mandates all foreign NGOs submit annual reports and register with police 
bureaus.144 Registering NGOs requires adhering to a long list of restrictive regulations, 
obtaining government sponsorship, and limiting the type of and manner in which 
information is released publically.145 This is why many groups still operate in a tenuous, 
unofficial capacity, which under the new law has become even more difficult. These 
organizations are also hampered by a need to remain politically neutral and avoid certain 
strict taboos so as not to fall afoul of the government. Even this is not as straightforward 
is it may seem. Vague notions of ‘national security’ can be invoked to deny or revoke an 
organization’s registration. The government’s ambiguous signaling and mixed messaging 
can be seen as a “low-cost way to contain dissent, gather information, and keep options 
open,” without taking definite positions on specific policy issues.146 These restrictive new 
policies are viewed by many in the NGO community as a crackdown on foreign influence 
that undermines the authority of the Communist Party. 
While these obstacles have made advocacy on certain social issues such as 
freedom of the press and speech nearly impossible, many ENGOs have operated in China 
by positioning themselves as government allies and valued sources of technical assistance 
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and public outreach. To this end, organizations such as WCS are committed to building 
stronger relationships with government agencies and providing resources and technical 
expertise to facilitate cross-border customs enforcement training and collaboration.147 
This value-added, capacity building approach is viewed as necessary to establishing 
strong relationships between NGOs and the Chinese government.148 Fostering 
relationships, or guanxi, with agency officials is also critical to drawing the government’s 
attention to key issues and moving policy at higher levels of government. NGOs that 
position themselves as a critical service providers for state agencies and that share 
government policy goals are more likely to succeed and even benefit from government 
support. 
 Increasingly, journalists and independent citizens have adopted the role of 
environmental overseers by publicizing instances of official and corporate negligence, 
but the lack of an independent press and the arbitrary detention of journalists and activists 
persists in China. Across a range of country studies, press freedom is shown to be a key 
factor in reducing official corruption, due to an independent media’s capacity to publicize 
such corruption and to apply consistent pressure on the government to detect and punish 
these crimes.149 Independent investigative journalism can reduce information 
asymmetries between different levels of the bureaucracy and the public as well as 
diminish an agent’s incentives for corruptions.150 In China, the Internet has become the 
preferred medium for rapidly and widely disseminating public interest stories faster than 
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censors can shut them down, often leaving the government no choice but to act. Public 
outrage generated both within and outside of China regarding the city of Yulin’s annual 
dog meat festival has exerted significant pressure on Chinese officials to ban the trade in 
dog meat in China.151 Outcry among China’s ‘netizens’ generated by posts on social 
media of private citizens and public officials bragging about eating the endangered 
pangolin spurred subsequent investigations and arrests.152 Largely due to increased public 
outcry, in 2012 the Chinese government banned shark fin soup at official banquets in an 
attempt to crack down on official extravagance, another win for conservationists.153  
In areas like environmental protection, the government has increasingly turned to 
its citizens for support in monitoring and reporting crimes. China’s State Forestry Agency 
has commended people who provide its social media accounts with actionable 
information on illegal wildlife consumption, stating that these concerned citizens’ reports 
have contributed to the enforcement of China’s Wildlife Protection Law.154 In 2013, a 
firsthand account of elephant poaching in Africa by a journalist from Guangdong 
Province’s Southern Weekend generated millions of views and thousands of comments 
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across Chinese social media.155 Although international media is well positioned to spread 
these messages, homegrown journalism and online activism is essential if China is to 
develop its own environmental movement. Conservationism cannot be imposed from 
outside, it must come from within, with Chinese voices leading the call.  
 For the last three decades, the social contract between the Chinese people and the 
government has been one of sustained economic growth in exchange for political 
legitimacy. With a slowing economy and an unprecedented level of environmental 
degradation affecting everything from air quality to food scarcity, it is in the interest of 
both parties to redefine that contract for today’s economic and environmental context. 
Consistent grassroots pressure is necessary to shift high-level policy. Though young, the 
environmental movement in China is quickly growing. Since 1990, the number of animal 
protection and conservation organizations has increased from essentially none to over 
200 today.156 Young, urban Chinese are more likely to be aware of global environmental 
issues and to be active supporters of conservation efforts. They must continue to do more 
to hold policymakers at the highest level accountable for the high environmental costs of 
China’s development. In order to influence policy in China, they must also further 
integrate into the global conservation network through regular interaction with 
international environmental organizations and concerned citizens around the world. 
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III: Ivory Demand Survey Results 
STUDY INTRODUCTION 
There is widespread consensus that demand reduction must be a central focus for 
eliminating the ivory trade over the long term, as it is clear that command and control 
policies and supply-side enforcement alone are insufficient. As long as a taste for ivory 
remains among potential consumers and its legality remains inconsistent across state 
lines, gray and black markets will persist. In keeping with this, academic researchers and 
non-profit organizations are attempting a more nuanced approach to understanding the 
determinants of demand for ivory and other wildlife products. Surveys and research by 
organizations such as WWF and National Geographic have begun to shed greater light on 
how deep-rooted demand is and how a stronger foundation in specific cultural, economic, 
and psychosocial aspects of illicit consumption is needed if a comprehensive demand 
reduction strategy is to be found.157 
This survey, designed in 2015 by Dr. Joshua Busby of the L.B.J. School of Public 
Affairs and myself, and conducted with the assistance of an online survey company, 
attempts to shed some light on how potential consumers of ivory products react to 
specific normative messaging. The focus was less on how widespread ivory consumption 
was in China and more on how to shift consumption attitudes with targeted information 
campaigns. How does conservation messaging modify consumers’ responses to questions 
about personal behavior and attitudes? What are the stigmas associated with ivory 
consumption? How do people perceive the social and environmental impacts of their 
consumption behavior, and how—if it all—do they think this behavior should be 
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regulated? Our survey sample is divided into four treatment groups, each receiving a 
different message: a control group with no message, a criminal ‘punishment’ group, an 
‘elephants suffer’ group, and a ‘people suffer’ group. Each treatment, in the form of a 
news story and corresponding photo, was meant to present one negative aspect of the 
global illicit trade in ivory. Each ‘news story’ (a brief paragraph) begins the same way 
and ends with one or two sentences that depict each of the different treatments.158 
Based on results from previous surveys as well as prior qualitative research on 
demand discussed in the first section, a theory was formulated on the impacts of the 
treatments and other demographic and attitudinal variables on respondents’ willingness to 
admit their intent to buy ivory or their having purchased it in the past. Dr. Busby and I 
speculated that each of the treatments would reduce willingness to admit purchasing 
ivory relative to the control group, and that the ‘punish’ treatment might have the 
strongest effect, given the harsh penalties for ivory trafficking crimes and the tendency 
for Chinese citizens to look to the government for social guidance. We believed weakly 
embedded environmental values and limited exposure to conservation campaigns across 
demographic groups would render the ‘elephants suffer’ and ‘people suffer’ treatments 
less effective. Additionally, although previous surveys describe knowledge of elephant 
well-being and population trends as not having a major effective on buyer attitudes, we 
felt accurate knowledge of elephants and the ivory trade would have a significant 
negative impact on stated intent to buy ivory.  Furthermore, we expected an accurate 
understanding of the legal status of ivory in China would have a similar effect, as those 
unaware of the mixture of illegal and legal ivory and relevant regulations would have less 
reason to hide their past or intended purchases. We hypothesized that those who receive a 
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treatment will report having purchased or intending to purchase ivory at significantly 
lower rates compared to the control group.  We expect these effects to be more significant 
among younger, more educated, middle class respondents, which previous studies have 
shown are more informed and susceptible to conservation messaging.   
SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
Survey Sample  
In lieu of a comprehensive population-wide survey or in depth qualitative 
research, our approach was to better understand how potential consumers respond to anti-
ivory messaging with a targeted experiment. Rather than collecting descriptive statistics 
on a notoriously elusive demand group, we subjected a large sample of more than 1,300 
Chinese internet users to a set of treatments geared towards modifying ivory consumption 
behavior in order to better understand which messages are more effective. Respondents 
were not randomly sampled, but volunteered to complete an online survey about 
‘international issues’ in exchange for a small payment. It should be understood, therefore, 
that this is a sample of convenience and is by no means indicative of the general Chinese 
population. Only those who had access to the Internet would be able to complete the 
survey. This sample, therefore, likely favors wealthier and more educated urban 
residents.159 For the sake of comparative analysis, the survey was repeated on a second 
sample of 841 men to see if the results of the experimental survey could be replicated. 
Each of the respondents was randomly assigned to one of the treatment groups, which 
controls for demographic variability within each subsample. Although we are unable to 
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generalize to the wider Chinese population, this method allows us to isolate the treatment 
effect and minimize the effect of confounding factors.  
Survey Details & Implementation 
The treatments consisted of a mock news story and corresponding photo depicting 
one particular negative aspect of the ivory trade. The first group was a control 
(henceforth referred to as “control”) and received no news story or photo. Group two 
(referred to as the “punish” treatment group) received an article describing the legal 
status of ivory in China and a particular case of prosecution against Chinese citizens for 
ivory trafficking. The photo depicts Forestry Police officers around a table of confiscated 
ivory products. Group three (henceforth referred to as the “elephants suffer” treatment 
group) received a paragraph discussing the decline in African elephant populations and 
China’s responsibility in ending the trade. The photo shows pallets of raw ivory. The 
final treatment (referred to as the “people suffer” treatment group) describes Chinese 
demand for ivory as potentially fueling violent conflict in Africa by funding militant 
groups. The photo depicts heavily armed African soldiers surrounding the remains of an 
elephant. 
The specific treatment messages were selected not only because they are 
representative of the impacts and consequences of the ivory trade, but also because they 
focus on themes heavily covered by western conservation NGOs in their information 
campaigns across Asia. It is important to assess the overall efficacy of these campaign 
strategies by testing how people modify their responses to questions based on which 
treatment they receive. The hope is that these results may help future campaigns tailor 
messages to specific audiences or avoid messages that do not have the intended effect. 
Statistically significant effects of treatments on stated intent to buy ivory due to one-time 
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messaging can be interpreted to be the result of a powerful signaling medium, but they 
must be taken with a grain of salt. High significance values only describe a correlation, 
and are not proof of a causal relationship between treatment and stated intent to purchase 
ivory. Most importantly, we must remember that stated intent cannot be interpreted as an 
accurate proxy for demand. Respondents may be hiding their actual purchase histories 
because of feelings of guilt or shame stirred by the messaging they received. It is also 
beyond the scope of this study to understand how a negative message might reinforce 
negative behavior, rather than reduce it. Finally, we cannot be sure how long a change in 
attitude will endure after the survey is complete. As any advertiser knows, a message 
must be constantly reinforced in order to have a prolonged effect on consumption 
behavior.  Repeating a treatment that has a significant one-off effect on how subjects 
respond can potentially deepen its impact. Conversely, some messaging may be 
ineffectual beyond a certain number of exposures as subjects’ knowledge deepen and 
they become more accustomed to the imagery.   
 The first part of the questionnaire covers general attitudinal issues, consumption 
habits, and preferences for non-wildlife products such as groceries and non-specific 
luxury items. Other aspects covered were attitudes towards food quality and safety, 
foreign versus domestic products, and perceived medicinal properties of certain non-
ivory wildlife products. The next section covers general knowledge of ivory, from origin 
countries to how it is harvested, the perceptions of its legal status, risks to consumers of 
purchasing ivory, and its availability in the Chinese domestic market. Several questions 
attempt to address the how respondents perceive the value of ivory. Additionally, a series 
of questions are asked about whether the respondent has given or received or knows 
anyone who has given or received ivory in the past along with which type of ivory 
products and the reasons for gifting. A more in depth line of questioning follows 
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attempting assess the perceived incentives and disincentives for purchasing ivory and 
both the government’s and the consumer’s responsibilities regarding the illegal markets.  
The final two sections of the survey revolve around political behavior and general 
demographic questions. The demographic questions cover, age, income, gender, 
educational, political affiliation, employment, province of residence, and many other 
aspects. The political behavior section asks if respondents would be willing to become 
involved in public campaigns to address illicit trafficking. Respondents were asked if 
they would write letters, sign petitions, talk to family and friends about illegal ivory, and 
so on. They are then asked to enter their names in an online petition as a sign of 
commitment to stop buying ivory products. 
Tabulations & Descriptive Statistics 
The following sections covers some of the more informative tabulations assessing 
attitudes towards ivory, consumption intent, and general knowledge of the ivory trade and 
the legal status of ivory in China. Of our survey respondents, 15.7% stated they had 
purchased ivory in the past, planned to in the future, or both, 10.9% planned to in the 
future, and 4.8% had in the past but did not plan on buying again in the future. In the 
men-only sample, 17.6% were past or future ivory consumers, and 12.6% stated they 
would likely buy in the future. The latter category was of particular interest in better 
understanding how consumer preferences might change and for what reasons. Between 
buyers and non-buyers, the valuation of ivory varied somewhat (view graph below). 
Future buyers tended to view the financial value of ivory (34.7%) as the most important 
reasons to purchase ivory, while non-buyers and past buyers tended to weigh the 
perceived status derived from ivory (41.4% and 33.8%, respectively) as a more important 
quality. Aesthetic value, while relatively low in both groups, was almost twice as 
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important among future buyers than the other two categories (13.3% to 7.6%). Results of 
chi-squared test were statistically significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 31.98, p-value = 
0.000), meaning there is less than a 0.1% likelihood of these results occurring due to 
random chance. Responses varied little between treatments and control, implying that the 
messaging had no significant effect on respondents’ valuation of ivory.  
Respondents’ Reasons for Buying Ivory 
 
 Reasons for not buying ivory varied somewhat between the three groups. Future 
buyers were the least likely to view purchasing ivory as morally wrong. If purchased as a 
gift, the majority of respondents in both groups said they would keep ivory for its 
aesthetic value (buyers 59% and non-buyers 63.2%). The below graph shows that moral 
opposition to the purchase ivory was the number one stated reason among non-buyers 
(44.6%) and (only) past buyers for not buying ivory (52.5%)(χ2 = 29.09, p-score = 
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0.001). Price was a large disincentive among future buyers (29.7%), and among non-
buyers (26.7%), implying that falling prices might lead some marginal consumers to 
purchase ivory. 
Respondents’ Reasons for Not Buying Ivory 
 
Non-buyers (n = 1,341), Past buyers (n = 77), Future buyers (n = 173) 
 
Non-buyers in both the control and treatment groups were much more likely to 
state they believed ivory to be impossible to obtain (53.9%), while only 10.4% of past 
buyers and 15.6% of future buyers made this claim (χ2 = 264.1, p-score = 0.000). Past 
buyers who received a treatment were much less likely to report that ivory was very easy 
to find than those in the control group (this could be partly due to the smaller sample size 
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of n = 77). This effect, strangely, was reversed in the future buyers group, who, if treated, 
were more likely to say ivory was easy to find. 
Perceived Ease of Access to Ivory Among Buyers and Non-buyers 
   
 Perception of legality was a third area where variation between buyers and non-
buyers proved significant (χ2 = 136.6, p-score = 0.000). The below graph shows that non-
buyers were much more likely to believe ivory was completely illegal (52.2%), whereas 
just 20.3% of those intending to purchase in the future believed this. 37.5% of 
respondents who bought ivory in the past but did not plan on buying again believed ivory 
to be completely illegal. These results were found to be consistent in the second sample 
as well. It is possible that the legal status of ivory played a large role in their decision not 
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to purchase ivory again. The data also shows that accurate knowledge of ivory’s legal 
status at the time of the survey (some legal, some illegal) was fairly consistent, regardless 
Perception of Ivory’s Legal Status Among Buyers and Non-buyers 
 
of intent to buy, with future buyers having a slightly better understanding of ivory’s 
ambiguous legality. Again, we see treatment has only a small effect on responses 
between buyer groups, the most notable being among the past buyers, who were more 
likely to answer that ivory was somewhat or totally illegal if they received a treatment. 
This could be the result of the messaging reinforcing a pre-existing belief that ivory is 
illegal or unethical in past buyers with no stated intent to buy again. The numbers in the 
second men-only survey were fairly consistent with these results. 
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The perceived role of the government in ensuring that the illegal ivory market be 
controlled varied substantially and significantly between buyers and non-buyers (χ2 = 
189.10, p-score = 0.000). A large majority of non-buyers and past buyers (56.9% and 
47.1%) claimed to support a total ban and confiscation, while only 18.6% of future 
buyers did. Closing the domestic market and permitting ownership had consistent support 
across all categories (average of 36.2%). These results are consistent with numbers from 
the second survey sample and varied only slightly when divided between treatment 
groups and the control group (not shown here). 
Perception of Government Role in Ivory Market 
 
A number of other observations on respondents’ understanding of ivory’s legal 
status bear mentioning. Many fewer past and future buyers than non-buyers admitted to 
being unable to tell the difference between legal and illegal ivory (18.0% versus 
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52.5%)(χ2 = 141.5, p-score = 0.000). Furthermore, past buyers and non-buyers were more 
likely to believe that being caught with illegal ivory would lead to prison time (60%) than 
future were future buyers (40%), who were more likely to believe that they would receive 
no punishment or at most a ‘slap on the wrist’ (25% future buyers and 6% in the non-
buyer category)(χ2 = 83.1, p-score = 0.000). From these results one can tentatively 
conclude that ivory consumption is strongly correlated with a lack of fear of punishment 
as well as greater confidence in being able to distinguish between legal and illegal ivory, 
which is impossible to do with the naked eye. 
Perception of Impact of Ivory Trade on Elephants 
 
Finally, there is also a significant relationship between buyer group and the stated 
perceived impact of the ivory trade on elephants (χ2 = 165.0, p-score = 0.000). The above 
figure shows that 68.4% of non-buyers and 66.2% of past buyers confirmed their 
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understanding that harvesting ivory resulted in the death of elephants, whereas only 
31.8% of future buyers stated they understood this. Being exposed to a treatment message 
seemed to increase past and future buyers stated understanding relative to the control 
group that tusks don’t in fact regrow and that taking them kills the elephant. Past buyers 
and future buyers in a treatment group were 11.7% and 15% more likely respectively 
than those in the control to respond that taking ivory resulted in the death of the elephant. 
Subjects in the ‘elephant suffer group’ were 7.9% more likely than those in the other two 
treatment groups to confirm understanding that elephants died in this process, but this 
difference was not statistically significant (χ2 = 11.68, p-score = 0.232). Among wealthier 
men in the second sample, understanding of the lethality of the ivory trade was greater, 
with at least 50% of all buyer groups—and 82.1% of the non-buyer group—stating that 
elephants die as a result of taking their tusks. 
DEMAND CORRELATES & TREATMENT RESULTS 
Treatment Effects on Ivory Consumption Attitudes 
The binary chi2 tests of significance were used to identify where statistically 
significant relationships exist between a variety of potential independent variables—the 
most important to our research being ‘treatment’—and the dependent variable ‘all 
buyers.’160 The discovery of significant chi2 tells us little, however, about the nature of 
that relationship. In order to better understand the extent of that relationship, a series of 
regressions were run to understand the exact numeric impact of the independent variables 
on ‘all buyers.’ Two logistic regressions were run testing two separate sets of variables. 
In the first, the influence of treatment group on a respondent’s propensity to state he or 
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she had bought or was planning to buy ivory was tested, controlling for a number of 
independent variables found to be significant. The second regression tests responses to a 
number of attitudinal questions about the ivory trade, ivory policy, and consumer 
responsibility and how those shift between treatment groups and the control group.  
Our independent variable of focus was ‘Treatment.’ I hypothesized that being 
subject to any treatment would decrease the odds of a respondent admitting to being a 
buyer, especially in regards to future intent. As stated before, I also thought ‘punish’ 
would yield more significant effects because cultural conservation norms about elephants 
are still weak in China, while the government’s presence in daily life is more firmly 
established. I also believed that receiving a treatment would have a positive effect on a 
respondent’s knowledge of the ivory trade, and stated support for increased measures to 
combat illegal trafficking. To better understand the subgroup effects of ‘treatment,’ I 
included a number of demographic variables I predicted had a strong relationship with 
buyer status based on previous research, and confirmed with chi2 analysis. Due to the 
significant relationship between these demographic variables and ‘All buyers,’ including 
them in the regression equation also allowed me to take a conservative approach in 
determining the significance values of the predictor ‘treatment’ on ‘all buyers’ by holding 
constant any unobserved relationships between other determinants and the dependent 
variable.161  
Beyond the treatment variable, I believed income to be positively correlated with 
buyer status, specifically that an increase in wealth would correlate with higher odds of 
being a past or future buyer. I hypothesized that membership in the Communist Party, 
because of its culture of gift giving as a means of relationship building and career 
                                                
161 Additionally, because this experiment was conducted online rather than in a controlled environment, 
holding additional independent variables constant in the regression helped improve the accuracy of the 
results. 
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advancement, would also be positively correlated with ivory consumption. Education 
level is more complicated because as education level increases, income tends to as well, 
and past studies have showed a positive correlation between being more educated and 
being a potential buyer. On the other hand, higher education is also likely correlated with 
increased exposure to demand reduction campaigns and greater knowledge of wildlife 
trafficking in general.  
In the logistic regression output, an odds ratio less than one means the 
independent variable decreases the odds of the dependent variable ‘future buyer’ 
increasing from 0 to 1 (or going from non-buyer to buyer) by a corresponding percentage. 
So, an odds ratio of 0.72 means that respondents within that category of the independent 
variable have 28% lower odds of being in the buyer group. An odds ratio of more than 
one means the independent variable increases the likelihood of a move from non-buyer to 
buyer by an equivalent percentage (i.e., an odds ratio of 1.17 means respondents within 
that category have 17% higher odds of being in the buyer than non-buyer group). The 
regressions, chi2 tests, and tabulations were all conducted in STATA version 14. A 
significance value of α = 0.05 (a less than 5% probability of the result being do to 
random chance) was applied to tests of significance. Any result deviating by two or more 
standard deviations from the mean was considered a significant result and not due to 
random chance. Z scores of 1.96 or higher were therefore judged to be statistically 
significant. Highly statistically significant results with odds ratios that did not differ 
greatly from zero were considered not substantively important, and therefore have a 
negligible practical effect on the dependent variable. 
All Buyers Regression Results 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All buyers       |    Odds Ratio      Std. Err.      z       P>|z|      
-----------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Treatment        | 
         Control |   (Reference group) 
          Punish |     .6918628       .1502563     -1.70     0.090      
Elephants Suffer |      .552938       .1247132     -2.63     0.009**      
   People Suffer |     .6467621       .1410677     -2.00     0.046*    
-----------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
Gender           | 
            Male |   (Reference group) 
          Female |     1.066057        .1738104     0.39     0.695      
Age              |     .9756386        .0088428    -2.72     0.007**        
                 | 
Income Bracket   | 
       <150K RMB |   (Reference group) 
   150K-200K RMB |     1.472167        .4456738     1.28     0.201      
   200K-300K RMB |     1.836925        .5417404     2.06     0.039*      
   300K-500K RMB |     2.187553        .6853911     2.50     0.012*      
       >500K RMB |     2.508917        .7555746     3.05     0.002**     
                 | 
Education Level  | 
     High School |   (Reference group)  
         College |     .8408173        .1930705    -0.76     0.450      
   Post-graduate |      .682741        .2543212    -1.02     0.306      
                 | 
Party Status     | 
      Non-member |   (Reference group)    
          Member |     1.875706        .3333562     3.54     0.000***      
                 | 
Medicine         | 
             TCM |   (Reference group) 
         Western |     .6729426        .1128847    -2.36     0.018*      
           _cons |     .4112793        .1950494    -1.87     0.061      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* Significant at 5%                      ** Significant at 1% 
The results of the regression confirmed a number of expectations. Most 
importantly, I found significant differences between how respondents in different 
treatment groups answered questions about personal ivory consumption. Both the 
‘elephant’s suffer’ and the ‘people suffer’ treatments had a statistically significant impact 
on the dependent variable ‘all buyers’ relative to the control group.163 Their odds ratio tell 
us that, compared to respondents in the control group, those in the ‘elephants suffer’ 
group and the ‘people suffer group’ were 44.7% and 35.3% less likely, respectively, to 
respond that they had already bought or planned to buy ivory in the future. Contrary to 
expectation, the ‘punish’ group was shown to have no similar statistically significant 
effect. This is consistent with a previous demand survey’s finding that respondents in 
                                                
163 Although men and women claim to buy ivory at almost identical rates, men were more responsive to the 
“elephants suffer” treatment, an effect that decreased in significance with increasing income. Women 
responded more to the “people suffer” treatment, regardless of income. 
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China expressed considerable doubt in their government’s capacity to regulate the ivory 
trade.164 It must be remembered that it is incorrect to claim, because of these treatments, 
intent to purchase ivory in the future has been reduced by the corresponding amounts 
among those respondents. We can say with some confidence, however, that those 
treatments induced a greater number respondents to hide their past purchases or future 
intent compared with the control. This implies certain types of messaging might be more 
effective at either reducing demand or creating an increased sense of guilt or shame than 
others.  
When compared with the second sample of all males, we found no significant 
effects on ‘all buyers’ due to treatment. Treatment also had no significant effect on 
respondents of either gender in the highest two income brackets (>300,000RMB). The 
wealthiest respondents seem to be most resistant to messaging. Why this occurs is a 
question for further research. While this study can shed light on the efficacy of treatments 
on specific groups, it can say nothing about why certain treatments work or do not. It is 
possible that those in the wealthiest group are less affected by this messaging because 
they are already more exposed to it and have already formed firm opinions on the ivory 
trade. These more traditional moral pleas may need to be updated with newer approaches 
for this particular demographic group.  
The regression results also showed a number of other correlations between 
demographic indicators and odds of being or not being an ivory consumer. As expected, 
we found strong statistical evidence to support the assumption that the higher a 
respondent’s income bracket, the greater the odds of them also being in the buyer group. 
Those in the highest bracket, 500,000 RMB (about 73,200 USD) or greater, had 2.5 times 
                                                
164 National Geographic and Globescan. Reducing Demand for Ivory: 19. 
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greater odds of being in the buyer group than those who made less than 150,000 RMB 
(roughly 22,000 USD) a year. Interestingly, the odds of being a future buyer are 32.7% 
higher for respondents who preferred traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) to western 
medicine than those in the non-buyers group to a statistical significant degree (z-score = -
2.36). Party membership was also found to be highly correlated with ‘all buyers.’165  The 
odds of being in the future buyers group for Communist Party members, who accounted 
for just over 17% of the sample, were 87.6% higher than for non-Party members (χ2 = 
32.49, p-score = 0.000). This correlation was confirmed in our second men-only sample 
study as well (odds ratio = 1.94, z-score = 2.93). Age, although statistically significant (z 
= -2.72), was found to have only a marginal practical influence on ‘all buyers’ (odds ratio 
= 0.98).166 Education level, gender, and geographical region were only a few of the 
factors that were found to have no statistically or practically significant relationship with 
a respondent’s propensity to identify as a past or future buyer. While previous studies 
showed that buyers in China tended to be more highly educated than the population 
average,167 higher rates of education may also be correlated with greater understanding of 
the negative impacts of the ivory trade and increase exposure to information campaigns; 
two trends that may pull in opposite directions.168  
                                                
165 This result was further confirmed by running the regression on only respondents in the control group. 
The significance score for Party membership remained similarly high (z = 2.63, odds ratio = 2.35). 
166 In further regression tests, respondents 45 and older showed a statistically significant correlation 
between being in the buyer group and either the ‘punish’ (z-score = -1.97) or ‘people suffer’ (z-score = -
2.35) treatment. For respondents 25 and under, there was no significant correlation for any treatment with 
being a buyer, suggesting perhaps that this type of moral messaging is less effective on a younger audience. 
In a separate chi2 test, respondents 35 and under were shown to be the only group to have higher than the 
predicted value of future buyers, a worrying sign that potential ivory consumers skew younger (χ2 = 63.3, 
p-score = 0.000). 
167 National Geographic and Globescan. Reducing Demand for Ivory: 18. 
168 For the sake of saving space and preventing spurious variations in significance among the remaining 
predictor variables, many of the demographic variables that were found to be statistically and practically 
insignificant in both dichotomous chi2 tests with the dependent variable ‘Allbuyers’ and in previous 
regressions were removed. Numerous tests for collinearity revealed no significant linear relationships 
between predictor variables, hence the absence of interaction terms in the regression equation. 
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 In order to disentangle the treatments and better understand their effects relative 
to one another, a margins test of the categorical variable “treatment” was conducted 
(figure on next page). In a margins test, STATA calculates the predicted value for ‘all 
buyers’ at the mean value of all other independent variables based on each treatment 
group. In this case, for all respondents in the treatment group ‘elephants suffer,’ all things 
equal, they would have odds of 14.1% of also being in the ‘all buyers’ group, compared 
to 22.7% for the Control. This is lower than any other treatment group (‘punish’ and 
‘people suffer’ have odds of 17.1% and 16.2% of being in the ‘future buyer’ group). High 
z-scores across the board tell us that each is margin is statistically significant from zero. 
The below figure shows the mean predicted probability of ‘all buyers’ for each treatment 
group and the corresponding 95% confidence interval. 
Margins Plot of Treatment Groups 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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                   |            Delta-method 
                   |     Margin     Std. Err.       z        P>|z|      
-------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
         Treatment | 
          Control  |   .2267805     .0243322      9.32       0.000      
           Punish  |   .1705155      .022129      7.71       0.000      
 Elephants Suffer  |   .1419276     .0205361      6.91       0.000      
    People Suffer  |   .1614788      .021356      7.56       0.000      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
A comparison of each treatment’s margin to every other treatment’s margin 
represents visually how much of a difference one treatment makes compared to the others 
on ‘all buyers.’ Looking at the below output, one can see the greatest difference is 
between the ‘elephants suffer’ and control groups (0.0849). This means that, compared to 
the control, those in the elephants suffer treatment were 8.49% less likely to say they 
have bought or will buy ivory, all other things equal. The difference between the ‘people 
suffer’ and control groups is 6.53%. These two comparisons are the only ones without 
zero in the confidence interval, and can therefore be said to be statistically significant 
with 95% confidence.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                    |       Delta-method         Unadjusted 
                                    | Contrast   Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------------------------+------------------------------------------ 
                          Treatment | 
                 Punish vs Control  | -.05627     .03291    -.12086    .00833 
       Elephants Suffer vs Control  | -.08485     .03182    -.14721   -.02249* 
          People Suffer vs Control  | -.06530     .03244    -.12889   -.00171* 
        Elephants Suffer vs Punish  | -.02859     .03029    -.08795    .03077 
           People Suffer vs Punish  | -.00904     .03072    -.06925    .05117 
People Suffer vs  Elephants Suffer  |  .01955     .02968    -.03862    .07772 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The above results offer evidence for a tentative conclusion that receiving some 
messaging rather than none at all can indeed modify consumers’ responses to questions 
on ivory attitudes. Assuming that the control group offers the closest approximation of an 
honest set of responses to the survey questions, if all that changes is the treatment, there 
are significant initial shifts in the way people respond to questions about buying ivory. 
That means, all other things equal, conservation messaging does in fact alter how people 
respond to questions about being a past or future buyer. The margins treatments also 
show that potential buyers were more likely to modify their responses if they received the 
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‘elephants suffer’ or ‘people suffer’ treatment rather than the “punish” treatment, which 
may reflect a lack of credibility in the oversight capacity of law enforcement in China or 
that moral messaging is more effective than initially believed. One can tentatively 
conclude that, of the treatments employed, evidence suggests that moral and ethical 
appeals were more effective than a fear of punishment in modifying responses.  
In order to further explore subgroup variation by treatment, a multinomial 
regression model was run with ‘treatment’ as the only independent variable across 
different buyer groups. Other predictor variables were excluded because, due to random 
sub-sampling, demographic variability was evenly distributed throughout each of the 
treatment groups. This showed the variability of how treatment influenced a subject’s 
response to questions about past consumption and future intent to purchase ivory. 
Between buyer groups, we see significant discrepancies in the way people responded to 
specific treatments. Relative to our non-buyer group (which is set equal to 0 in the output 
below), people in the ‘people suffer’ treatment were significantly less likely to answer 
that they had been past buyers. Respondents in the ‘elephants suffer’ group were less 
likely to report being future buyers. No treatment had a statistically significant effect on 
respondents who had purchased in the past and planned to do so again in the future, 
implying that they were relatively unaffected by any treatment’s message relative to the 
control group. 
Multinomial Regression for Treatment Groups 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        All buyers |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|      
-------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Non-buyers         |  (base outcome) 
-------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Past Buyers        | 
         Treatment | 
          Control  | (reference) 
           Punish  |  -.3461281   .3123913    -1.11   0.268     
 Elephants Suffer  |  -.4681227   .3167057    -1.48   0.139     
    People Suffer  |  -.6798578    .341022    -1.99   0.046*     
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                   | 
             _cons |  -2.455636   .2043572   -12.02   0.000     
-------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Future_Buyers      | 
         Treatment | 
          Control  | (reference) 
           Punish  |  -.2981736   .2886292    -1.03   0.302     
 Elephants Suffer  |  -.7290053   .3195601    -2.28   0.023*     
    People Suffer  |  -.3709737   .2918798    -1.27   0.204     
                   | 
             _cons |  -2.312535   .1913992   -12.08   0.000     
-------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Past and Future    | 
         Treatment | 
          Control  | (reference) 
           Punish  |  -.2948346   .3081505    -0.96   0.339     
 Elephants Suffer  |  -.4681225   .3167057    -1.48   0.139     
    People Suffer  |  -.4285435   .3168959    -1.35   0.176     
                   | 
             _cons |  -2.455636   .2043572   -12.02   0.000     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Although we see that being in a treatment group does have an influence on 
whether or not respondents claim to have bought or be planning to buy ivory, there is 
variation between buyer groups and it is difficult to make a strong substantive claim for 
any one particular treatment over another, or indeed that one-off messaging will have any 
significant effect on consumption behavior. As we see from this survey and others, 
support for ivory bans and pro-conservation opinions are not necessarily as closely 
related to ivory consumption attitudes as we might have previously thought. As our 
survey and others have found, better-educated respondents are not necessarily less likely 
to be interested in purchasing ivory. Previous studies have shown that Chinese buyers and 
non-buyers have similarly levels of exposure to ivory trade issues.169 It is also possible 
that negative messaging may drive ivory consumption behavior underground rather than 
truly reducing it. Feelings of guilt and shame could potentially further reinforce negative 
behaviors.170 One of the  limitations of this survey is that it is impossible to establish 
whether responses reflect real behavior change or are simply a defensive response to a 
perceived moral criticism. In order to better understand the evolution of people’s attitudes 
                                                
169 National Geographic & Globescan, Reducing Demand for Ivory: 19. 
170 Lertzman, Reducing Desire for Ivory, 18.   
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in response to different sorts of messaging, a more nuanced, qualitative approach is 
needed to supplement broader quantitative surveys such as this one. Additionally, 
negative reinforcement and moral arguments only show part of the larger psychosocial 
picture of demand. Future studies can employ positive messaging to see how consumers 
respond to other methods of satisfying the needs and desires currently filled by ivory. 
Attitudes & Knowledge of Ivory within Treatment Groups 
A second research question in this study focuses on how being placed in a 
treatment group affects stated attitudes towards ivory policy, the responsibilities of 
consumers and government in preventing illegal trade, and the perception of knowledge 
about ivory between buyers and non-buyers. In order to test this, I ran binary logistical 
regressions to see how receiving a certain message affected subjects’ responses to a set of 
specific attitudinal questions. Primarily, I wanted to know whether treatment influences 
peoples actual and perceived knowledge of the ivory trade. Second, I felt it important to 
assess which demographic variables influence perceived and actual knowledge. 
“Elephant knowledge” is a binary variable that divides those who answered two 
questions about elephants correctly into one group, and those that answered at least one 
incorrectly into another. Those questions were: “Worldwide, the elephant population is 
______” (Answer: Declining) and “Harvesting elephant ivory ______” (Answer: Kills 
the elephant). ‘Identify’ is binary variable that divides respondents into two groups, those 
who believe they can distinguish illegal from legal ivory and those who admit to being 
unable. These two served as the response variables for logistic regressions. I found that 
the only independent variables correlated with both actual knowledge of elephants and 
the respondent’s misguided belief in the ability to distinguish between legal and illegal 
ivory were intent to purchase ivory and income. Treatment was not significantly 
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correlated with actual or supposed knowledge. Interestingly, both gender and age 
accurately predicted actual knowledge of elephants and elephant conservation. Women 
tended to answer more questions than men incorrectly. Age was a strong predictor of 
knowledge, but the odds ratio is negligible, meaning being older correlates significantly 
with only a one percent increase in the  correct answer score.  
Treatment Effect on Knowledge 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Elephant knowledge | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|      
-------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
         Treatment | 
          Control  | (reference) 
           Punish  |   .8183544   .1479873    -1.11   0.268      
 Elephants Suffer  |   1.204319   .2194287     1.02   0.308      
    People Suffer  |   .9719456    .174752    -0.16   0.874      
                   | 
            Gender | 
             Male  | (reference) 
           Female  |     .63889   .0832034    -3.44   0.001**      
               Age |   1.014061   .0068738     2.06   0.039      
                   | 
   Income bracket  | 
       < 150K RMB  | (reference) 
  150K - 200K RMB  |   1.411087   .3007539     1.62   0.106      
  200K - 300K RMB  |   1.430722   .2955124     1.73   0.083      
  300K - 500K RMB  |    1.80025   .4090419     2.59   0.010**      
       > 500K RMB  |   2.042407   .4440367     3.28   0.001**      
                   | 
        All buyers | 
       Non_buyers  | (reference) 
      Past Buyers  |   .8684162   .2555153    -0.48   0.632      
    Future Buyers  |   .1387494   .0308885    -8.87   0.000***      
                   | 
             _cons |   .8514651   .2390738    -0.57   0.567      
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------	  
Each move up in income bracket corresponds with an increase in the odds of 
having accurate knowledge on elephant conservation. Interestingly, however, being in the 
highest income bracket also correlated significantly with assuming the ability to 
distinguishing between legal and illegal ivory correctly (odds ration = 2.31, z = 3.93). 
The relationship holds in just the control group as well. This implies that although 
wealthier subjects are more likely to be exposed to and have absorbed some form of 
conservation messaging in the past (or in this experiment), they are also more confident 
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in their preternatural ability to distinguish between legal and illegal ivory, and therefore 
be able to avoid breaking the law or contributing to the poaching crisis in Africa. This 
assumption is concering because it could lead to the rationalization of purchasing ivory 
even if one is informed and agrees with a conservation policy.  
Perhaps the most alarming, although not entirely unexpected, result of this test is 
that future buyers were significantly more likely than others to answer elephant 
knowledge questions incorrectly, and significantly more likely to claim to be capable of 
distinguishing between legal and illegal ivory (odds ratio = 6.18, z = 4.19). While past 
buyers were also likely to make this claim (odds ratio = 3.22, z = 1.98), there was no 
similar correlation with knowledge for this group. Whether intentionally or not, future 
buyers displayed ignorance in both circumstances. This can be understood to mean both 
that there is still need for conservation message with an educational aim and greater 
public service announcements that detail the legality of ivory. Specifically, ads can focus 
on illegal and legal ivory being impossible to distinguish between with the naked eye. 
This is especially true when dealers disguise recently poached ivory by dying the outside 
of the tusks to make them appear antique. The upcoming domestic ban alone is likely not 
enough to discourage all ivory consumption especially if doubt or lack of knowledge are 
used as rationalizations for illegal behavior. A strong push to educate the public that it 
will soon be illegal to purchase any ivory is necessary to remove all doubt.   
Finally, a score was generated to represent a subject’s attitude towards greater or 
lesser regulations in the domestic ivory market. The lower the score, the less favorably a 
subject viewed government control and the less responsibility they felt consumers should 
take in preventing the illegal traffic in ivory. Treatment had no significant effect on how 
subjects viewed greater or lesser control and responsibility by either party (χ2 = 18.65, p-
score = 0.230). A subject’s buyer group, however, was significantly correlated (χ2 = 
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316.12, p-score = 0.000). Compared to the overall sample, future buyers 
disproportionately viewed greater government and consumer responsibility negatively 
and were generally in favor of decreased regulations and controls. 
Treatment Effects on Political Action 
Equally important to this research was forming a better understanding of the 
likelihood of respondents in different treatment groups taking political action in support 
of reducing ivory consumption. We also sought a better understanding of how 
demographics, consumption habits, and attitudes towards ivory affect statements of intent 
regarding political and social behavior. The following questions were asked of all 
respondents in all treatment groups: 
 
 
• How likely is it that you would sign a petition in support of efforts to ban the ivory trade? 
• How likely is it that you would write a letter, e-mail, or phone your local government to ban the ivory 
trade? 
• How likely is it that you would write a letter or e-mail your local paper to support a ban on the ivory 
trade? 
• How likely is it that you would talk to your friends and family to support a ban on the ivory trade? 
• How likely is it that you would donate money to an organization in support of banning the ivory trade? 
• How likely is that you would join a group in support of banning the ivory trade? 
 
Respondents answered on a four-point scale: “not at all likely,” “not very likely,” 
“somewhat likely,” and “very likely.” The final question asked if they would sign a 
pledge to never again buy ivory products and enter their name in the blank provided. This 
was meant as a test of commitment with a somewhat higher potential cost to respondents 
than simply stating they would be likely to take action. 90.3% of all respondents agreed 
to sign and then entered their names, including 87.7% of respondents who previously 
stated they had bought ivory in the past and were planning on buying ivory in the future. 
96% of respondents who stated having purchased ivory in the past but were not planning 
to buy in the future signed the pledge. A Pearson’s chi2 test showed there was not quite a  
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significant relationship between a respondent signing the pledge and his or her being a 
buyer or non-buyer of ivory (χ2 = 5.13 p-score = 0.077).171 The fact that such a high 
percentage of respondents who stated they planned to buy ivory in the future also signed 
the pledge not to buy ivory in the future suggests there is little relationship between the 
action of taking the pledge and future intensions. The only demographic variable that 
proved statistically significant in the regression variable ‘pledge signature’ was gender (z 
= 2.01). Results show that the odds of a woman signing the pledge were 55% higher than 
for men, all other things equal. In the men-only survey, 84.5% of all respondents signed 
the petition. Treatment had no statistically significant effect on whether or not a subject 
decided to sign the petition in this sample either (χ2 = 3.84 p-score = 0.280).172 
Political Action Regression Results 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Political Action |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|      
---------------------------------+------------------------------------- 
All buyers                | 
              Non-buyers  |   (Reference group) 
             Past Buyers  |   .3069181   .0882236     3.48   0.001**      
           Future Buyers  |  -.2075155   .0637775    -3.25   0.001**     
                          | 
Treatment                 | 
                 Control  |   (Reference group) 
                  Punish  |   .0462982   .0523958     0.88   0.377     
        Elephants Suffer  |  -.0253554   .0522623    -0.49   0.628    
           People Suffer  |   .0322783   .0522501     0.62   0.537 
                          | 
Party Status              | 
              Non-member  |   (Reference group) 
                  Member  |   .0793443   .0448276     1.77   0.077     
Income_bracket4           | 
           150K-200K RMB  |   .1050714   .0634268     1.66   0.098     
           200K-300K RMB  |   .1233004   .0616216     2.00   0.046*      
           300K-500K RMB  |   .1999231   .0668248     2.99   0.003**      
               >500K RMB  |   .0697011    .063457     1.10   0.272 
                                                
171 In a separate test, the past buyer group was very close to statistical significance (z = 1.87). With an odds 
ratio of 3.88, this a sign of a potentially important practical relationship between stating you only bought 
ivory in the past and deciding to sign the petition. Past buyers have odds almost four times higher than non-
buyers and almost five times higher than future buyers of signing the petition. Due, however, to a small 
sample size (only 2 of 71 past buyers were non-signatories), it is impossible to establish a definitive 
relationship here. 
172 Although the z-scores for the logistic regression were not quite statistically significant between 
treatment and signature, the odds ratios show that receiving some treatment rather than none led to an 
increase in the likelihood of a signature (Punish = 1.50, Elephants Suffer = 1.56, People Suffer = 1.35). 
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                          |     
Age                       |  -.0044115   .0019802    -2.23   0.026*     
                          | 
Gender                    | 
                    Male  |   (Reference group) 
                  Female  |   .0643637   .0380399     1.69   0.091 
Elephant Knowledge        |  -.0103984   .0406047    -0.26   0.798          
Punishment                |   .1874685   .0389409     4.81   0.000**      
                          | 
Consumer Role             | 
   None, buy and sell OK  |    (Reference group) 
Buy only certified legal  |    .3274924   .0964485     3.40   0.001**       
             Stop buying  |    .4290864   .0978893     4.38   0.000**      
                          | 
Government Role           | 
      Allow import, sale  |   (Reference group) 
 Stop import, allow sale  |   .1461431   .1122607     1.30   0.193     
 Punish ill., allow own.  |   .0606356   .0991599     0.61   0.541         
  Confiscate and destroy  |   .2589651   .1000277     2.59   0.010*     
                          | 
                    _cons |   2.639075   .1396036    18.90   0.000           
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 * Significant at 5%                          ** Significant at 1% 
 The answers for the six political action questions, weighted on the four-point 
scale, were averaged together to generate a political action score for each respondent of 
between zero and four. The data for this score was not normally distributed and very 
right-skewed (favoring taking action over not), but this was determined not to be 
problematic because of a very large sample size of over 1,300. Two-variable chi2 
tabulations were performed to first find the predictor variables most closely associated 
with the political action score. Then, a numeric regression was conducted to assess which 
of those predictors, when controlling for all others, were most closely related to an 
increased or decreased likelihood of a respondent taking political action. As with the 
prior regression analyses, particular focus was paid to the treatment variables to see how 
they might influence political action (see above regression output). 
 The results of the regression show treatment does not play a significant role in 
predicting political action. In fact, very few of the predictor variables that were found to 
be significant in the future buyer regression were found to be significant here. The 
treatments’ coefficients are also low, implying that even with a statistically significant 
result, the treatment would account for a relatively small percentage of the political action 
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score. Income, however, was found to be significant. Moving from the second bracket to 
the third and the third to the fourth resulted in statistically significant 0.12 and 0.20 
increase in political action score. Although this is substantively minor increase, it does 
suggest that those with higher income might be more likely to take action. Age was also 
found to be significant, although with a very small practical effect. An increase in age is 
correlated with only a slight dip in the political action score. Believing in harsh criminal 
punishment for purchasing illegal ivory was also correlated with higher political action 
scores, as was support for greater consumer and government responsibility in addressing 
the illegal ivory trade.  
Political Action Scores for Ivory Consumers 
 
The most interesting result came from the “All Buyers” category in which 
respondents were divided into “non-buyers,” “past buyers,” and “future buyers.” Being a 
future buyer had a highly significant negative effect on the political action score. A 
 82 
coefficient of -0.21 implies that moving from the non-buyer to the future buyer category 
would decrease political action score by a corresponding amount. Those who had 
purchased ivory in the past but were not planning to again in the future had a statistically 
significant and positive coefficient of 0.31, meaning that moving from the non-buyer to 
the past buyer category corresponds to a 0.31 point increase in the political action score. 
The figure above shows this in graphical form with the median political action score and 
the confidence interval for each category of buyer. We see that past buyers are the most 
concentrated category, meaning a larger percentage of past buyers clustered around that 
higher median political action score. One can infer that respondents claiming to be past 
buyers are significantly more likely even than non-buyers to claim they will take political 
action. 
DISCUSSION 
Practical Implications of Results 
 From the results of the above tabulations and regression analyses, a number of 
and tentative conclusions can be drawn that may be useful in modifying the messaging 
and scope of future demand reduction campaigns and enforcement efforts in China. It 
must be remembered, however, that these are the results of an exploratory survey and 
analysis using two samples that are not representative of the wider Chinese population. 
Any results herein must be taken as a speculative first pass meant to highlight areas for 
potential further research, not hard and fast conclusions about Chinese ivory consumption 
behaviors. The most immediately evident observation, as with all surveys of its kind, is 
the difficulty of understanding the complex nature of demand and consumption attitudes. 
An experimental survey such as this one helps to shed light on some questions but 
simultaneously raises a host of others. To what extent can we assume a modification in 
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response to specific treatment is a sign of true behavioral change rather than a dishonest 
answer due to feelings of guilt or shame? Furthermore, how might these psychological 
responses be useful or counterproductive to our long-term goal of reducing demand for 
ivory? To what extent can we really disentangle pre-existing opinions and biases from the 
influence of treatments? Though these survey results do not offer many definitive 
conclusions, they can help to refocus information campaigns on more targeted audiences 
with better tailored messaging. Understanding a respondent’s initial emotional response 
to a particular message is an important first step in addressing behavior through 
information campaigns. The following preliminary conclusions and recommendations are 
derived from the preceding experimental results. 
First, perceived availability of ivory and differences in the understanding of its 
legal status had a large impact on a respondent’s stated ivory purchase history and intent. 
76.5% of non-buyers viewed obtaining ivory in their areas as “very difficult” or 
“impossible,” while only 38% of buyers felt this way (p-score = 0.000). Taken along with 
the fact that 26.7% of non-buyers cited price as the main reason not to buy ivory (p-score 
= 0.001), it is important to consider how much high prices and inaccessibility influences 
demand for current non-consumers. There is likely a ‘dormant’ demand group that does 
not refrain from buying ivory by choice, but instead does so for financial and access 
reasons. The closure of the legal market that is underway has already significantly 
depressed prices domestically in China. It is possible that while access will be 
increasingly restricted, lower prices might encourage consumption among a section of the 
population that previously was not part of the ivory market. When designing enforcement 
policies and further demand reduction campaigns, policymakers must be aware of the 
negative aspects of falling prices and the potential for new, socio-economically diverse 
groups becoming active wildlife consumers.  
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A further concern is that many fewer ivory consumers fear criminal punishment 
than do non-buyers. This can mean one of two things. Either criminal enforcement is 
insufficient to dissuade a substantial percentage of the consumer group from buying, or 
that this group is particularly resistant to threats of enforcement and must be targeted 
through other methods. The former is supported by previous survey results that showed 
45% of respondents felt laws in China are poorly enforced.173 Either way, falling ivory 
prices in the Chinese domestic market are not necessarily a permanent trend and should 
not be understood to be a reflection of falling demand across all potential consumer 
groups. In our multinomial regression results, it was observed that the ‘people suffer’ 
treatment had a more significant effect on the past buyers group, and the ‘elephant suffer’ 
treatment was more likely to reduce claims of future intent to buy. Although it is difficult 
to claim definitively why this happened, it shows that those treatments effective 
responses differently, either by presenting knowledge that was previously known or by 
inspiring greater feelings of guilt and shame in past and future buyers. Further research is 
needed to better understand these effects. 
Another important result of this survey is that accurate knowledge of elephant 
population trends and the impacts of poaching are strongly correlated with decreased 
stated demand for ivory, but inaccurate knowledge can work in the opposite direction. 
Contrasting previous studies that show that knowledge of the status and threats to 
elephants are similar among likely buyers and non-buyers,174 this study finds that, non-
buyers stated they understood that harvesting ivory killed elephants at more than twice 
the rate that past and future buyers did (69.6% versus 30.1% in the control group). 9.6% 
of buyers said it was harmless and 30.1% said that the tusks regrow. Although this is not 
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hard proof that there is a disparity of knowledge between buyers and non-buyers, it does 
suggest that buyers are more willing to rationalize that their consumption of ivory doesn’t 
seriously affect elephants, in spite of what they already may now about poaching and the 
ivory trade. Furthermore, results showed that people who responded accurately that 
elephant populations were in decline also had much higher odds of being in the non-
buyer category. However, false assumptions that some consumers had about being able to 
distinguish legal from illegal ivory by its appearance, which can be easily altered to 
resemble antique ivory, or from legal certificates, which are often forged or reused, was 
strongly correlated with the being a buyer. Campaigns that focus on the legal liability of 
purchasing ivory and vendors’ unscrupulous trade practices could be an effective way of 
targeting potential buyers who are unaware or claim ignorance of the legal risks they 
incur when buying ivory online or at retail outlets. 
This research has also served to shed some light on new demographic correlates 
of demand for ivory in China, two of the most significant being membership in the 
Communist Party and a preference for Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) over 
Western medicine. Both of these independent variables were shown to have a strong 
positive relationship with ivory consumption to highly statistically and practically 
significant degrees. The first of these correlates, Party membership, which was a highly 
significantly related to ivory consumption in both the mass sample and the men-only 
sample, is a particularly complicated issue. First, it suggests President Xi’s focus on 
weeding out corruption and cracking down on lavish consumption within the Party is 
indeed well founded. The culture of gift giving within the Party remains strong, and 
luxury products like ivory will only become more valuable status symbols with 
increasing scarcity. Perhaps greater intra-governmental focus is needed to spread the 
stigma of ivory consumption among officials and reduce bribery and luxury gift giving of 
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all kinds. This can be achieved through greater political transparency and a stronger 
mandate for the Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection, the agency charged 
with policing government officials. It is also essential that journalists and private citizens 
continue to publicize incidents of official malfeasance, particularly as it pertains to illegal 
wildlife consumption, in order to put greater pressure on government bodies to enforce 
their internal policies. 
The second major determinant, preference for TCM, is no less complicated or 
difficult to address. Deep-rooted cultural and historical factors have made attitudes 
towards TCM particularly resilient. Furthermore, an active propaganda campaign by the 
government to bolster the cultural status of TCM within China is sending mixed 
messages to the general population about consumption versus conservation. It is possible 
that the use of TCM, which relies heavily on ingredients derived from wild animals and 
plants, can help people rationalize the consumption of other wildlife products—such as 
ivory—that have essentially no alleged medicinal purposes. The survey results suggest 
this may be the case, as respondents with a preference for TCM over Western medicine 
were 33% more likely to be in the buyer category. The government could consider 
distancing itself from active promotion of TCM, or alternatively, design promotional 
propaganda campaigns around traditional medicinal therapies that are free of wildlife 
products. 
Unlike previous surveys, this study did not show as strong a relationship between 
other predictors such as education and the dependent variable, “All buyers.” Additionally, 
some observed correlations between the dependent variable and the predictor “treatment” 
varied greatly between subgroups of the sample. Age was one such modifier which, when 
divided into subgroups, resulted in highly different levels of significance for the 
treatment variable on “All buyers.” From these initial results, it is difficult to say what the 
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drop-off in efficacy for treatments among respondents under 25 is due to. Expanding the 
scope of the experiment to include messaging that speaks more to younger generations’ 
experiences and desires may be a potential solution. Furthermore, respondents 35 and 
under were more likely to than the rest to be in the “future buyer” group, reinforcing 
previous research claiming that prospective buyers are indeed younger. Finding 
appropriate messaging that targets younger consumers is essential for long-term demand 
reduction campaigns.   
Consistent with previous statistical and qualitative studies, higher incomes prove 
to be one of the major drivers of demand for elephant ivory in China and one of the most 
problematic. Not only were the wealthiest respondents more than 2.5 times more likely to 
be in the buyer group than were respondents in the lowest income bracket, they were also 
the least responsive to the experimental treatments. Why this is remains an open question. 
It is possible respondents with higher incomes, who also tended to be older and more 
educated (92% had at least a college degree), have already been exposed to a greater 
number of similar conservation campaigns in the past and have already formed their 
opinions of this type of messaging and therefore are less likely to be swayed by it. Higher 
income respondents were also somewhat more likely to answer questions on elephant 
population trends and poaching accurately than the other groups. Those who claimed an 
income of over 300,000RMB a month were more than 10% more likely to answer all the 
questions correctly than were respondents who made less than 200,000RMB per month. 
(χ2 = 9.14, p-score = 0.01). Exposure and education, in this instance, may be working to 
temper the effects of this one-off messaging experiment. Again, a wider range of 
treatments, targeting the positive perceived aspects of ivory, rather than just its negative 
environmental and social impacts, may prove to be a better approach to influencing this 
group of consumers. Further research is needed.  
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Future campaigns should target younger, wealthier potential consumers. 
Results of the political action regression study suggest that, although treatments 
had little perceivable effect, people from certain demographic groups are more likely to 
take political action on elephant conservation. Specifically, future information campaigns 
should look to target younger, wealthier potential consumers. Women were also shown to 
be more likely than men to sign the pledge not to buy ivory and may, therefore, be more 
likely to take political action on public campaigns. Additionally, past buyers with no 
stated intention of buying ivory in the future are a more politically mobilized group for 
messaging a larger audience. They were more likely to have greater moral objections to 
the ivory trade than other groups, and were even more likely than non-buyers to state they 
would take political action against ivory trafficking. As past consumers, they were also 
shown to have a better understanding of the legal and regulatory aspects of the trade and 
may have greater familiarity with more subtle psychological aspects of desire for ivory. 
For this reason they may be ideal recruits to serve as opinion leaders and mobilizers.  
Past buyers can be mobilized to spread conservation messaging. 
The second aspect of political action, the signing of the pledge, provided less 
conclusive results. A vast majority of each buyer group agreed to and signed the pledge, 
implying that among many potential ivory consumers, there exist a rationalization gap 
between individual consumption behavior and political action. It is possible that, as was 
concluded in the National Geographic survey, consumers do not perceive the impact of 
their consumption on global conservation efforts, and therefore make conflicting 
statements.175 Some respondents are capable of simultaneously supporting greater 
restrictions on the ivory trade while still intending to purchase ivory products in the 
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future. They may even make empty pledges to abstain from purchasing ivory products as 
long as it imposes little cost on them personally. Both this survey and the National 
Geographic and Globe Scan survey showed similarly high levels of support for enhanced 
restrictions on the sale ivory between buyers and non-buyers, with as many as 67% of 
buyers saying they would support the total ban in the latter and 58% of future buyers 
supporting complete market closure in the former.176 On the other hand, it is possible that 
prospective ivory buyers perceived little cost in taking an empty action and signing the 
petition. It may have even helped to assuage feelings of guilt or shame caused by a 
greater understanding of the negative impacts of the ivory ban. 
Continued Public Education is Essential to Changing Norms on Ivory 
 The results of the treatment regressions and margins tests showed that those 
subjected to some form of conservation messaging were more likely to modify their 
responses to questions than those who received none. In particular, those who received 
the elephants suffer treatment then responded that they had purchased or were interested 
in purchasing ivory in the future at a rate of only 14.19% compared to 22.69% in the 
control group (a relative change of 37.46%). This could mean either that a significant 
percentage of respondents felt guilt and shame and therefore decided to answer 
untruthfully, or that a certain number of respondents even considered modifying future 
behavior in response to new knowledge of the impacts of the ivory trade. From these 
statistical results it is impossible to conclude which of these occurred. Furthermore, this 
research showed strong statistically and substantively significant correlations between 
possessing accurate information on the ivory trade and stronger support for conservation 
policy and a decrease in the odds of a respondent admitting to being a buyer. Again, 
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although this is not proof of decreased consumption behavior, it does show that those 
with greater exposure and knowledge are more likely to have internalized certain 
conservation norms and are, at the very least, less willing to admit to consuming ivory. 
Regardless of whether treatment truly modifies behavior, these results are 
significant because they show that even one-off exposure to conservation messages can 
modify responses to questions about consumption habits. The hope is that repeated 
exposure to certain types of messaging can lead to norm changes and, over time, 
potentially modify behavior as well. Demand reduction is a slow process. Even in the 
U.S. and Europe it took decades for ivory to fall out of favor with the majority of the 
population. Raising awareness of the impact of the ivory trade is only the first step in 
changing behavior. Demand is ‘sticky’ and desire is notoriously hard to pin down. 
Regular exposure to certain messaging is necessary to embed accurate knowledge and 
new norms that weren’t previously widespread amongst Chinese wildlife consumers. 
Which form of messaging is the most effective is still open to debate, but this experiment 
shows that some Chinese consumers are more responsive to messaging focused on the 
suffering of elephants and people rather than the risks of punishment. Further qualitative 
research in the form of in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and interviews will 
be needed to better understand the actual behavior modifying capabilities of different 
awareness campaigns. 
Survey Drawbacks & Areas for Further Analysis 
These survey results are a first pass at understanding how segments of the 
Chinese population react to certain forms of conservation messaging. Alone, they provide 
few definitive conclusions as to which messaging is most effective and how to modify 
ivory consumption behavior through awareness campaigns. They do, however, help to 
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narrow the search by singling out specific correlates of ivory demand and providing 
initial statistical results on how certain types of consumers react to the negative impacts 
of the global trade in ivory. What are needed now are both repeat studies to help confirm 
the results presented above and follow-on studies that capture the specific psychological 
and cultural aspects of demand through in-depth interviews and focus group studies with 
ivory consumers.  
The first notable drawback of this study is that the sample was not representative 
of the wider Chinese population. It was a sample of convenience in which respondents 
volunteered to answer the survey in exchange for payment. For this reason, it was biased 
towards wealthier and more educated urban residents. Sample average incomes and 
education levels did not accurately reflect countrywide trends. Time and finances 
permitting, a larger sample collected through a variety of online, telephone, and in-person 
interview methods would help dilute this bias and allow surveyors to cover segments of 
the population left out by a strictly online survey. 
The selection of treatments was also a limiting factor in this study. Partly to 
reflect current conservation campaigns, and partly to limit conflicting messaging between 
treatment groups that would make comparison difficult, the three treatments focused on 
specific negative impacts of the trade. In future studies, rather than negative 
reinforcement, researchers could focus on the perceived positive aspects of ivory. In an 
attempt to understand motivations behind purchasing ivory, messages could be tailored to 
highlight how ivory increases a consumer’s sense of self worth or solidarity with a larger 
social group. The news story treatments could describe ivory’s cultural and historical 
significance in China, its importance as a social currency, or its potential spiritual 
benefits. Responses would then be analyzed to see which positive messaging increased or 
decreased a respondent’s odds of being in the buyer group and their opinions of ivory 
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products generally.  From these results, researchers might better understand the perceived 
benefits of ivory and other means of filling those desires. 
Although the treatments were effective at testing how responses are modified, 
there is no way to conclude how they may have impacted actual future behavior. 
Although many precautions were taken to prevent respondents from becoming aware of 
the conservation focus of the survey, a certain amount of framing bias within the subject 
matter of the questions inevitably persists. It was therefore impossible to ensure that all 
respondents answered truthfully. A possible solution to this is a greater focus on in-depth, 
qualitative research. Because of the complexity of demand and desire, the human-to-
human element is essential. Establishing a sense of mutual trust and understanding 
between researcher and subject can help to alleviate many of the barriers to responding 
honestly that are caused by feelings of guilt and shame often associated with ivory 
consumption.177 Well-designed focus groups and one-on-one interviews may help to 
alleviate some of those social pressures by establishing an atmosphere of respect and 
understanding. Although this would limit the reach of the study, it could give nuance to 
results obtained from mass surveys like this one. Well-trained researchers adept at 
decoding and interpreting ulterior meanings in responses can also discover far more about 
how desire for ivory allows certain respondents to rationalize conflicting behaviors and 
values.178 Broad-based, quantitative data should be supplemented with these more 
detailed and personal approaches if something as complex as demand for ivory is to be 
better understood.  
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Conclusions 
This report sheds light on the disconnect between Chinese consumers and a deep 
understanding of their environmental impact, a problem that allows for the rationalization 
unsustainable behavior. The long-term goal of environmental education in China is to 
build a bridge between consumers and their environment and spread the seed of 
conservationism throughout the Chinese middle class. In a remote corner of southwest 
China’s Yunnan province, a small population of fewer than 250 Asian elephants has 
survives to this day in the tropical forest that hugs the Burmese border, but is increasingly 
threatened by habit fragmentation. China’s population, now more than 50% urban, is 
similarly cut-off from the natural world around them that is being pushed to the brink of 
collapse to support the economic needs of 1.4 billion people and counting.  In order to 
increase ecological education and spread conservation awareness, it is imperative to re-
establish a strong connection between Chinese young urban population and nature. Just 
as the giant panda became the emblem of state-led conservation in China, the last 
remaining Chinese elephants can be that bridge between the Chinese consumer and the 
poaching crisis in Africa. It is important that the message be personalized—or 
Sinicized—and delivered by trusted local opinion leaders, in order to give young Chinese 
consumers a stronger stake in conservation efforts. Demand reduction and behavioral 
shift begin at the earliest stages with education. From an early age, public schools should 
focus on ecological education and school children should become acquainted with their 
own natural community through field trips and a more conservation-oriented science 
curriculum. Only in this way can desire for a product like ivory, with its deep-rooted 
cultural and social significance, be reduced and eventually eliminated.  
China must also come to terms with and address its deepening international 
footprint, both at the individual and public levels. The Chinese government has begun 
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collaborating with its neighbors on cross-border anti-trafficking operations and has made 
financial contributions to support conservation efforts in Africa, but more is needed to 
offset its huge environmental impact and educate its citizens. Specifically, the Chinese 
government could to more to reach out to and rein in the behavior of the employees at its 
state-owned enterprises in Africa and elsewhere. Criminal networks that traffic ivory 
transnationally often rely on embedded Chinese communities in Africa to source ivory 
from local poachers. There is also substantial evidence to support that ivory trafficking to 
Asia often follows in the wake of Chinese corporate expansion onto the continent.179 
Chinese nationals have been linked to ivory trafficking crimes in almost two-thirds of 
African elephant range states.180 More must be done to educate and warn overseas 
Chinese about these crimes, and state-owned companies must exercise greater oversight 
over their employees to crack down on this behavior.  
 While the efficacy of China’s domestic ivory ban remains to be seen, the 
government should waste no time exporting the ban to its neighbors in Asia and ensuring 
its own citizens do not travel abroad with the purpose of circumventing the ban. It is a 
significant achievement and should be an important diplomatic tool in its relations with 
ASEAN and other international communities. A growing concern amongst 
conservationists today is where all of China’s excess demand and Africa’s excess supply 
will go when the Chinese market is officially closed at the end of 2017. Leaky stockpiles 
currently in the hands of collectors and national governments are a significant problem. 
Less regulated markets along the China’s border such as Hong Kong, Laos, Myanmar, 
and Vietnam, which lack enforcement capacity and still allow the sale of ivory 
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domestically are already common source countries for ivory coming into China 
illegally.181 With the ban in place, this problem is likely to worsen. Singapore and Hong 
Kong are considering or are already in the initial stages of implementing ivory bans 
themselves.182 The Chinese government could do more to encourage others to adopt 
similar plans, especially those with which it shares strong cultural or political ties. 
Specifically, China should exercise its outsized influence over Hong Kong to urge 
implementation of its ban in advance of the proposed 2021 date to avoid a spike in 
demand fueled by mainland tourists. China could also encourage its neighbors to increase 
the punitive measures available for punishing traffickers183 and, together with NGO 
specialists, provide greater law enforcement training and support to countries struggling 
to control their under-regulated markets. 
This study builds off of the work of previous researchers and NGOs and 
represents only a small additional step towards a better understanding of the drivers of 
demand for ivory in China. It is imperative that the NGO community diligently watches 
the rollout of the Chinese domestic ivory ban, not only to ensure effective 
implementation, but also to better understand how prices are affected and demand for 
ivory changes over time. In July of this year, the largest single ivory seizure in three 
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decades was confiscated in Hong Kong—almost eight tons of ivory—in transit from 
Malaysia.184 Only three days later, three more tons were reported seized in Vietnam.185 
Whether this is evidence of criminal syndicates rushing to off-load stockpiles before 
ivory bans take effect, or more worryingly, that the dip in price is not in fact due to slump 
in demand but rather a glut in supply, it is clear that little has yet been accomplished and 
demand reduction efforts must be redoubled. My hope is that the insights offered here 
will inspire more comprehensive and detailed pursuits and help to inform and guide 
future policies and awareness campaigns to reduce ivory demand globally.  
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Appendix 
Treatment 1: ‘Punish’ 
 
中国加强了对非法进口象牙雕刻的惩罚力度 
China Increases Punishment for Illegal Ivory Carving Imports  
14年2月27日 
 
中国海关人员在北京国际机场截获了大量的象牙制品进口。图片来源：: ALEX 
HOFFORD/EPA Chinese	   customs	   officials	   interdict	   large	   shipment	   of	   ivory	   imports	   at	   the	   Beijing	   international	   airport.	  Photograph:	  ALEX	  HOFFORD/EPA	  
 
北京- 
中国在减少象牙贸易方面受到了越来越大的国际压力。中国最近实施了临时禁止进
口象牙制品一年的规定。政府人员希望该政策能够减少对象牙制品的需求。政府也
警告人们禁止从非洲带入任何象牙及其制品。在过去几年里，有超过7万人因与象
牙有关的违法行为而被定罪。例如：八个来自中国安徽省的居民因为在2010年至20
12年间走私了3.2吨的象牙而被判处有期徒刑3至15年不等。 
BEIJING – There is mounting international pressure to reduce China’s role in the ivory 
trade. China recently imposed a one-year moratorium on the import of ivory carvings. 
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Officials hope the policy will reduce demand for ivory products. The government has 
also warned its citizens not to bring back any ivory from Africa. More than 700 hundred 
people have been convicted for ivory-related crimes in recent years. For example, eight 
Chinese citizens were convicted and sentenced to 3 to 15 years imprisonment in east 
China's Anhui Province for smuggling a total of 3.2 tonnes of ivory between 2010 and 
2012. 
 
 
Treatment 2: ‘Elephants Suffer’ 
 
中国对象牙的需求导致了大象数量的下降  
Chinese demand for ivory leading to decline in elephants 
2014年2月27日 
 
对象牙的需求，尤其是来自中国的需求，导致了三年内死亡了10万只非洲大象。照
片来源：ALEX HOFFORD/EPA Demand	  for	  ivory,	  particularly	  from	  China,	  led	  to	  the	  deaths	  of	  100,000	  African	  elephants	  in	  three	  years.	  Photograph:	  ALEX	  HOFFORD/EPA	  
 
北京-中国在减少象牙贸易方面受到了越来越大的国际压力。“拯救大象”(Save 
The Elephant) 创始人Iain Douglas-Hamilton 
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说，根据他们的研究，2010年到2012年的三年间，非洲就有10万头大象因为象牙被
猎杀。中国成为了大象未来的关键因素，如果没有中国在结束对于象牙需求方面的
领导作用，非洲大象将很有可能在我们这一代从野外绝迹。 
BEIJING –There is mounting international pressure to reduce China’s role in the ivory 
trade. Iain Douglas-Hamilton, founder of Save the Elephants, said “one hundred thousand 
elephants were killed for their ivory in Africa in just three years between 2010 and 2012 
according to our research. China holds the key to the future of elephants – without 
China’s leadership in ending demand for ivory Africa’s elephants could disappear from 
the wild within a generation.” 
 
 
Treatment 3: ‘People Suffer’ 
 
中国对于象牙的需求导致了非洲的暴力 
Chinese demand for ivory leading to violence in Africa	  
 
2014年2月27日 
 
反对非法狩猎的特种兵和刚果士兵在瓜兰巴国家公园巡逻。照片来源：Tyler 
Hicks/NYTIMES 
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Anti-­‐poaching	   rangers	   and	   Congolese	   soldiers	   patrolling	   Garamba	   National	   Park.	   Photograph:	   Tyler	  Hicks/NYTIMES	  
 
北京-
中国在减少象牙贸易方面受到了越来越大的国际压力。在乌干达，圣主抵抗军 
（Lord's Resistance Army）成员和其他的非洲暴力反政府组织正在使用偷猎的大象 
的象牙进行贸易，交换大量的枪，物资和现金。通过向中国、泰国等地非法出售象
牙而获得的这些资金和武器，已经被证实为支持非洲撒哈拉以南地区的很多反政府
组织的一个重要来源。 
BEIJING –There is mounting international pressure to reduce China’s role in the ivory 
trade. In Uganda, members of the Lord's Resistance Army and other violent rebel groups 
in Africa are using ivory from poached elephants to trade for guns, supplies, and cash. 
The funds and weapons raised from the illegal sale of ivory to China, Thailand, and other 
countries have proven to be one important mechanism supporting many rebel groups in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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